Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Regret-based dynamics have been introduced and studied in the context of discrete-time repeated play. Here we carry out the corresponding analysis in continuous time. We observe that, in contrast to (smooth) fictitious play or to evolutionary models, the appropriate state space for this analysis is the space of distributions on the product of the players' pure action spaces (rather than the product of their mixed action spaces). We obtain relatively simple proofs for some results known in the discrete case (related to "no-regret" and correlated equilibria), and also a new result on two-person potential games (for this result we also provide a discrete-time proof).

Date: 2001-08, Revised 2003-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 45, pp.375-394.

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Related works:
Chapter: REGRET-BASED CONTINUOUS-TIME DYNAMICS (2013)
Journal Article: Regret-based continuous-time dynamics (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp309

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