Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia

Paolo Buonanno, Ruben Durante (), Giovanni Prarolo and Paolo Vanin
Additional contact information
Ruben Durante: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, CEPREMAP - Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications - ECO ENS-PSL - Département d'économie de l'ENS-PSL - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: With weak law-enforcement institutions, a positive shock to the value of natural resources may increase demand for private protection and opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, favouring the emergence of mafia-type organisations. We test this hypothesis by investigating the emergence of the mafia in twentieth century Sicily, where a severe lack of state property-rights enforcement coincided with a steep rise in international demand for sulphur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity. Using historical data on the early incidence of mafia activity and on the distribution of sulphur reserves, we document that the mafia was more present in municipalities with greater sulphur availability.

Keywords: Sicilian Mafia; Poor Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in The Economic Journal, 2015, 125 (586), pp.F175 - F202. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12236⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2015)
Working Paper: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2015)
Working Paper: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2012)
Working Paper: Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2012)
Working Paper: Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the origins of the Sicilian mafia (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03392970

DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12236

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().