Childbearing Age, Family Allowances, and Social SecurityPierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Although the optimal public policy under an endogenous number of children has been widely studied, the optimal public intervention under an endogenous timing of births has remained largely unexplored. This paper examines the optimal family policy when the timing of births is chosen by individuals who differ as to how early fertility weakens future earnings. We analyze the design of a policy of family allowances and of public pensions in such a setting, under distinct informational environments. Endogenous childbearing ages is shown to affect the optimal policy through the redistribution across the earnings dimension and the internalization of fertility externalities. Contrary to common practice, children benefits differentiated according to the age of parents can be part of the optimal family policy. Our results are robust to introducing: (i) children as durable "goods"; (ii) education choices; (iii) varying total fertility. Keywords: Family Allowances; Social Security (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Southern Economic Association, 2013, 80 (2), pp.385-413. ⟨10.4284/0038-4038-2012.061⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00916613 DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-2012.061 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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