Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions

Agnieszka Rusinowska and Akylai Taalaibekova ()
Additional contact information
Akylai Taalaibekova: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider a model of competitive opinion formation in which three persuaders characterized by (possibly unequal) persuasion impacts try to influence opinions in a society of individuals embedded in a social network. Two of the persuaders have the extreme and opposite opinions, and the third one has the centrist opinion. Each persuader chooses one individual to target, i.e., he forms a link with the chosen individual in order to spread his own "point of view" in the society and to get the average long run opinion as close as possible to his own opinion. We examine the opinion convergence and consensus reaching in the society. Also the case when the persuaders choose several targets for diffusion of information is discussed. We study the existence and characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the game played by the persuaders with equal impacts. This characterization depends on influenceability and centrality of the targets. We discuss the effect of the centrist persuader on the consensus and symmetric equilibria, compared to the framework with only two persuaders having the extreme opinions. When the persuasion impacts are unequal with one persuader having a sufficiently large impact, the game has only equilibria in mixed strategies.

Keywords: Social network; Opinion formation; Consensus; Targeting; Extreme persuader; Centrist persuader (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02195926
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019, 84, pp.9-27. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.05.003⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-02195926/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions (2019)
Working Paper: Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinion (2019)
Working Paper: Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions (2019)
Working Paper: Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions (2019)
Working Paper: Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions (2018)
Working Paper: Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions (2018)
Working Paper: Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02195926

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.05.003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().