Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions: the Case of Takeover Contests

Christian At and Pierre-Henri Morand ()

Abstract: This paper analyses jump bidding in ascending auctions in the case of takeover contests. The free riding condition explains that some jumps can occur driven by the own bidders free-rider condition. We also show that ascending auction can be inefficient.

Keywords: free-riding; takeover; jump bids (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Published in Economics Letters, 2008, 99 (3), pp.458-460

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Journal Article: Jump bidding in ascending auctions: The case of takeover contests (2008)
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