An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition

Guillaume Hollard and Stéphane Rossignol

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper explores a two-candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate has a valence advantage. Contrary to previous models, we introduce a multiplicative advantage, rather than an additive one. This takes into account the possible interaction between the quality of a candidate and his policy platform. This leads to a strikingly different model, in which all extreme voters support the favored candidate.

Keywords: Spatial voting; Valence advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00267218v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10 (3), pp.441-454. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00371.x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: An Alternative Approach to Valence Advantage in Spatial Competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00267218

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00371.x

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