Competition and Reputation

Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles

Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: In this paper the authors analyze the interaction of two disciplinary mechanisms: competition and reputation. They first study a dynamic model of monopolistic competition with experiencs goods (i.e., quality is observed after goods are purchased). When market power is high enough, reputation results in the equilibrium with perfect information being sustainable.

Keywords: COMPETITION; REPUTATION; DYNAMIC ANALYSIS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Competition and Reputation (2000)
Working Paper: Competition and Reputation (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco99/18

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