A lesson in market contestability: calculating the cost of Chinese state intervention in iron ore price negotiations

Luke Hurst ()

Trade Working Papers from East Asian Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract: This article analyses the motivation and impact of the 2009 intervention of the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) in benchmark price negotiations. The impact of the transition from benchmark pricing to a spot market mechanism, which was a consequence of the CISA’s intervention, is examined using a constrained bilateral monopoly model to calculate the financial impact of switching pricing mechanisms on Australian exporters and Chinese importers.

Keywords: iron ore; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 L11 L16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A lesson in market contestability: calculating the cost of Chinese state intervention in iron ore price negotiations (2015)
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