A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent

Jacob Glazer () and Ariel Rubinstein ()

Levine's Working Paper Archive from David K. Levine

Date: 2011-09-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents (2012)
Working Paper: A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent (2012)
Working Paper: A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents (2012)
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