Constitutions and social networks

Ana Mauleon, Nils Roehl () and Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Nils Roehl: Department of Economics, University of Paderborn; BiGSEM, Bielefeld University, Germany

No 2014003, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players’ preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market.

Keywords: social networks; constitutions; stability; many-to-many matchings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2014.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Constitutions and Social Networks (2015)
Working Paper: Constitutions and Social Networks (2015)
Working Paper: Constitutions and Social Networks (2014)
Working Paper: Constitutions and Social Networks (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2014003

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