The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata (Now published in Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp.1259-1282.)

Dilip Abreu and Ariel Rubinstein ()

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Date: 1987
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