Orders to Supply as Substitutes for Commitments to Aftermarkets

Zhiqi Chen and Tom Ross ()
Additional contact information
Tom Ross: University of British Columbia, http://www.economics.ubc.ca/

Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) from Carleton University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A number of recent antitrust cases in the United States, Canada and Europe have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. Earlier work suggested that even if the market for the original product is very competitive, a market imperfection might exist if the manufacturer cannot commit ex ante to pricing repairs at marginal cost.

Keywords: DURABLE GOODS; atter markets, refusals to deal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1996-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Orders to Supply as Substitutes for Commitments to Aftermarkets (1998)
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