Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

No 24, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.

Keywords: State Dependent Feasible Sets; Renegotiation; Implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D60 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:24

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