Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions

Juan-José Ganuza, Marco Celentani and Jose-Luis Peydro

No 106, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: International business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public officials by foreign firms. We first analyze a convention styled after the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" that requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We then study the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties.

Keywords: International Corruption; OECD convention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-10
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Working Paper: Combating corruption in international business transactions (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:106

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