Rational social distancing in epidemics with uncertain vaccination timing

Simon K. Schnyder, John J. Molina, Ryoichi Yamamoto and Matthew S. Turner

Abstract: During epidemics people may reduce their social and economic activity to lower their risk of infection. Such social distancing strategies will depend on information about the course of the epidemic but also on when they expect the epidemic to end, for instance due to vaccination. Typically it is difficult to make optimal decisions, because the available information is incomplete and uncertain. Here, we show how optimal decision-making depends on information about vaccination timing in a differential game in which individual decision-making gives rise to Nash equilibria, and the arrival of the vaccine is described by a probability distribution. We predict stronger social distancing the earlier the vaccination is expected and also the more sharply peaked its probability distribution. In particular, equilibrium social distancing only meaningfully deviates from the no-vaccination equilibrium course if the vaccine is expected to arrive before the epidemic would have run its course. We demonstrate how the probability distribution of the vaccination time acts as a generalised form of discounting, with the special case of an exponential vaccination time distribution directly corresponding to regular exponential discounting.

Date: 2023-05, Revised 2024-04
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Published in PLoS One 18, e0288963 (2023)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2305.13618

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