When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?

No 269298, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K ¸ 3 alternatives and n ¸ 3 voters, we …nd su¢cient conditions for the game to be dominancesolvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives. When n is large, “almost all” games can be classi…ed as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when n ¸ 4, and the outcome is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is su¢ciently replicated.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 1999-12-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? (2004)
Working Paper: When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable? (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269298

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269298

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