Joint Use of Liability and Regulation in Environmental Law
Stephan Michel (),
Alessandro Romano and
Ugo Zannini
No 5, ILE Working Paper Series from University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics
Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that the joint use of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules is efficient when there are uncertainty surrounding causal investigations and regulatory myopia. As these conditions are generally met in environmental cases, we provide an explanation for the frequent coexistence of these two instruments to control activities that create a risk for the environment. Moreover, we suggest that a joint use of liability and regulation should more frequently be optimal at the European (Federal) level than at the Country (State) level.
Keywords: Regulation; Liability; Joint Use; Causal Uncertainty; Regulatory Myopia; Precautionary Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K32 L50 Q52 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ilewps:5
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