Estimating damages from price-fixing: The value of transaction data

Kai Hüschelrath, Kathrin Müller and Tobias Veith ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 12-036, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.

Keywords: antitrust policy; private enforcement; cartels; overcharge; damages; cement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12036

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