Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework

Kai Hüschelrath and Jürgen Weigand
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 10-082, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.

Keywords: competition policy; monopolisation; predation; enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:10082

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