Local Network Externalities and Market Segmentation
A Banerji and
Bhaskar Dutta
Additional contact information
A Banerji: Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz-Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium
Keywords: network structure; network externalities; price competition; market segmentation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic, nep-mkt, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... s/2008/twerp_725.pdf
Related works:
Journal Article: Local network externalities and market segmentation (2009)
Working Paper: Local network externalities and market segmentation (2008)
Working Paper: Local Network Externalities and Market Segmentation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:725
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