Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms

Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite

CARESS Working Papres from University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences

Abstract: We analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people. In this model, self-enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition. However, the inefficent behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose. We demonstrate that in such cases, it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes, with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Class systems and the enforcement of social norms (1998)
Working Paper: Class systems and the enforcement of social norms (1996)
Working Paper: Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:pennca:97-3

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