Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.

Keywords: Bimatrix Games; Generic Finiteness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games (2010)
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