Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games

Vitaly Pruzhansky ()
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Vitaly Pruzhansky: Faculty of Economics and Business Adminstration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 03-101/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria are only mixed.

Keywords: Non-cooperative; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-19
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030101

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