A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games
Edited by Drew Fudenberg and
David Levine
in World Scientific Books from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Abstract:
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Keywords: Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
ISBN: 9789812818461
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https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/6880 (text/html)
Ebook Access is available upon purchase
Chapters in this book:
- Ch 1 Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games , pp 3-20
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 2 Limit Games and Limit Equilibria , pp 21-39
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players , pp 41-58
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 4 FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS , pp 59-66
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 5 On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements , pp 67-93
- Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps and David Levine
- Ch 6 When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? , pp 95-120
- Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
- Ch 7 REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER , pp 123-142
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 8 Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed , pp 143-161
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 9 MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONG-LIVED OPPONENT , pp 163-176
- Marco Celentani, Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
- Ch 10 When is reputation bad? , pp 177-205
- Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 11 THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION , pp 209-230
- Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin
- Ch 12 THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION , pp 231-273
- Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin
- Ch 13 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players , pp 275-307
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 14 An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information , pp 309-330
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 15 The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games , pp 331-343
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- Ch 16 Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient , pp 345-367
- Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Satoru Takahashi
- Ch 17 Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring , pp 369-388
- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wsbook:6880
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