Dictatorship, Democracy and Development

Mancur Olson
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Mancur Olson: University of Maryland

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2010, vol. 1, 167-183

Abstract: Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by «roving bandits» destroys the incentive to invest in produce, leaving little either the population or the bandits. Both can better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator — «a stationary bandit» who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes.

Keywords: dictatorship; democracy; development; classics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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