Tenure-track contract helps self-selection

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 4, 2482-2486

Abstract: Tenure-track contract is criticized for curbing the incentives to expend effort after obtaining tenured status. Yet the most productive faculties seem to work on a tenure contract, and schools which aim to employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer tenure-track contracts to their new recruits. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.

Keywords: tenure; academia; job market; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 J4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-21
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Tenure-Track Contract Helps Self-Selection (2015)
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