On the bargaining set of three-player games

Hugues Tchantcho (), Issofa Moyouwou () and Nicolas Andjiga ()
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Hugues Tchantcho: Faculty of Sciences, UY I, Yaounde, Cameroon
Issofa Moyouwou: ENS, UY I, Yaounde, Cameroon
Nicolas Andjiga: ENS, UY I, Yaounde

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 1, 429-436

Abstract: The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable utility cooperative game. We provide here an exhaustive determination of the bargaining set of any three-player game, balanced or not, superadditive or not.

Keywords: Three-player games; bargaining set; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-29
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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