Details about Winand Emons

Homepage:	https://winand-emons.ch/
Workplace:	Department Volkswirtschaftlehre (Department of Economics), Universität Bern (University of Berne), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Winand Emons.

Last updated 2024-10-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pem11

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Working Papers

2023

1. The Economics of Advice
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   Also in VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage", Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association (2023)
   Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2022)

2020

2. Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions
   Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft View citations (1)
   Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2020) View citations (1)

2018

3. The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion
   Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
   Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2018)
   See also Journal Article The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier (2020) View citations (9) (2020)

2016

4. Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs
   CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO
   Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2016)
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2016)
   See also Journal Article Strategic communication with reporting costs, Theory and Decision, Springer (2019) View citations (3) (2019)

2015

5. Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence
   Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft View citations (5)
   Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2015) View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE, Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International (2017) View citations (10) (2017)

2014

6. Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence
   Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft View citations (2)
   Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2014) View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence, Review of Industrial Organization, Springer (2018) View citations (10) (2018)

2013

7. Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2013)
   Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2013)
   See also Journal Article Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2016) View citations (6) (2016)

2011

8. Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
   Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (1)
   Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2009) View citations (4)
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2009) View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony, Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po (2020) View citations (1) (2020)
9. Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
   Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (4)
   Also in CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2011) View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier (2012) View citations (8) (2012)
10. Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
    VfS Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association View citations (3)
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2009) View citations (2)
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2009)
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2008) View citations (3)

2010

11. Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2010)
    See also Journal Article Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2013) View citations (2) (2013)

2007

12. Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2007)
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2007) View citations (9)
13. Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2006)
    See also Journal Article Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter (2009) View citations (1) (2009)

2005

14. Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2004) View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees, American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association (2006) View citations (13) (2006)
15. The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
    Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2005) View citations (4)
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2005) View citations (4)

2004

16. Conditional versus Contingent Fees
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (10)
    Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2004) View citations (8)
    See also Journal Article Conditional versus contingent fees, Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press (2007) View citations (19) (2007)
17. The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (8)
    Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2004) View citations (7)

2003

18. Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, American Law & Economics Association View citations (4)
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2003)
    See also Journal Article Escalating penalties for repeat offenders, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2007) View citations (31) (2007)

2002

19. Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
    Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2002)
    See also Journal Article Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders, Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International (2004) View citations (24) (2004)
20. The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model
    Discussion Paper Series, Hamburg Institute of International Economics View citations (12)
    Also in HWWA Discussion Papers, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) (2002) View citations (10)
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2002) View citations (10)
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (2002) View citations (10)

2001

21. A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2003) View citations (38) (2003)
22. Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2005) View citations (1) (2005)
23. Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

2000

24. Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts, European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer (2004) (2004)
25. Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2003) View citations (17) (2003)

1998

26. Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (1998) View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2000) View citations (9) (2000)

1997

27. Credence Goods Monopolists
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations (1)
    Also in Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (1995)
    See also Journal Article Credence goods monopolists, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier (2001) View citations (82) (2001)
28. Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
    Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (1997)
    See also Journal Article Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies, Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell (2001) View citations (6) (2001)

1996

29. Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) (1996)
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft (1996)

1994

30. Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft View citations (61)
    See also Journal Article Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts, RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1997) View citations (105) (1997)

1993

31. Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
    Also in Working Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research (1990)
    Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research (1990)
    See also Journal Article Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier (1996) View citations (15) (1996)
32. Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
    See also Journal Article Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade, Open Economies Review, Springer (1994) View citations (1) (1994)
33. The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
    Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (1994) View citations (9) (1994)

Journal Articles

2022

1. Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations
   American Law and Economics Review, 2022, 24, (2), 589-613

2020

2. Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
   Revue économique, 2020, 71, (3), 429-457 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony, Cahiers de recherche (2011) View citations (1) (2011)
3. The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
   International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020, 70, (C) View citations (9)
   See also Working Paper The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion, Diskussionsschriften (2018) (2018)

2019

4. Strategic communication with reporting costs
   Theory and Decision, 2019, 87, (3), 341-363 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs, CIRANO Working Papers (2016) (2016)

2018

5. Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence
   Review of Industrial Organization, 2018, 52, (3), 403-427 View citations (10)
   See also Working Paper Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence, Diskussionsschriften (2014) View citations (2) (2014)

2017

6. PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
   Economic Inquiry, 2017, 55, (4), 1833-1867 View citations (10)
   See also Working Paper Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence, Diskussionsschriften (2015) View citations (5) (2015)

2016

7. Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2016, 47, (C), 16-23 View citations (6)
   See also Working Paper Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts, CEPR Discussion Papers (2013) (2013)

2013

8. Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2013, 169, (4), 605-620 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians, CEPR Discussion Papers (2010) (2010)

2012

9. Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality
   International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2012, 30, (4), 352-360 View citations (8)
   See also Working Paper Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality, Cahiers de recherche (2011) View citations (4) (2011)

2009

10. Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets
    The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2009, 9, (1), 19 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets, CEPR Discussion Papers (2007) (2007)
11. The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon
    Applied Economics, 2009, 41, (22), 2867-2885 View citations (10)

2007

12. Conditional versus contingent fees
    Oxford Economic Papers, 2007, 59, (1), 89-101 View citations (19)
    See also Working Paper Conditional versus Contingent Fees, CEPR Discussion Papers (2004) View citations (10) (2004)
13. Escalating penalties for repeat offenders
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2007, 27, (2), 170-178 View citations (31)
    See also Working Paper Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, CEPR Discussion Papers (2003) (2003)

2006

14. Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees
    American Law and Economics Review, 2006, 8, (1), 20-32 View citations (13)
    See also Working Paper Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees, CEPR Discussion Papers (2005) (2005)
15. US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services
    Managerial and Decision Economics, 2006, 27, (5), 379-385 View citations (23)

2005

16. Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2005, 161, (3), 392-410 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony, Diskussionsschriften (2001) View citations (1) (2001)

2004

17. Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders
    Economic Inquiry, 2004, 42, (3), 496-502 View citations (24)
    See also Working Paper Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders, Diskussionsschriften (2002) (2002)
18. Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
    European Journal of Law and Economics, 2004, 17, (3), 307-327
    See also Working Paper Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (2000) View citations (3) (2000)

2003

19. A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2003, 23, (3), 253-259 View citations (38)
    See also Working Paper A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders, Diskussionsschriften (2001) View citations (5) (2001)
20. Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung
    Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), 2003, 83, (7), 423-435 View citations (1)
21. Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2003, 159, (2), 259-279 View citations (17)
    See also Working Paper Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers (2000) View citations (4) (2000)

2001

22. Credence goods monopolists
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001, 19, (3-4), 375-389 View citations (82)
    See also Working Paper Credence Goods Monopolists, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (1997) View citations (1) (1997)
23. Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies
    Journal of Industrial Economics, 2001, 49, (3), 247-268 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies, Diskussionsschriften (1997) (1997)
24. Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz
    Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), 2001, 81, (11), 664-668

2000

25. Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2000, 20, (1), 21-33 View citations (34)
26. Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2000, 156, (3), 431- View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller, CEPR Discussion Papers (1998) (1998)

1997

27. 12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1997, 17, (1), 1-2
28. Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1997, 28, (1), 107-119 View citations (105)
    See also Working Paper Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, Diskussionsschriften (1994) View citations (61) (1994)

1996

29. Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996, 14, (4), 465-484 View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration, Diskussionsschriften (1993) (1993)

1994

30. Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade
    Open Economies Review, 1994, 5, (3), 261-274 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade, Diskussionsschriften (1993) (1993)
31. The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1994, 14, (4), 479-491 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Diskussionsschriften (1993) View citations (2) (1993)

1993

32. An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts
    Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1993, 129, (IV), 625-642

1991

33. Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles
    European Economic Review, 1991, 35, (8), 1529-1542 View citations (2)
34. Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80
    Kyklos, 1991, 44, (3), 478-479
35. On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical
    The Review of Economic Studies, 1991, 58, (2), 375-390 View citations (33)

1990

36. Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals
    Journal of Public Economics, 1990, 42, (1), 89-104 View citations (19)

1989

37. On the Limitation of Warranty Duration
    Journal of Industrial Economics, 1989, 37, (3), 287-301 View citations (12)
38. The Theory of Warranty Contracts
    Journal of Economic Surveys, 1989, 3, (1), 43-57 View citations (21)

1988

39. Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1988, 46, (1), 16-33 View citations (25)

Chapters

2013

1. The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit
   Chapter 9 in Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, 2013, pp 175-192

1997

2. Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade
   Palgrave Macmillan View citations (1)