We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with nagents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior access to the ...

Bounding the price of anarchy, which quantifies the damage to social welfare due to selfish behavior of the participants, has been an important area of research in algorithmic game theory. In this paper, we study this phenomenon in the context of a game ...

In this paper, we study the connections between network structure, opinion dynamics, and an adversary's power to artificially induce disagreements. We approach these questions by extending models of opinion formation in the mathematical social sciences ...

Strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR) are incentive compatible for eliciting information about random variables from strategic agents when the principal can reward agents after the realization of the random variables. They also quantify the quality of ...

We build a model to study the implications of utilization-based minimum earning regulations of the kind recently enacted by New York City for its ride-hailing providers. We identify the precise conditions under which a utilization-based minimum earnings ...