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Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest ...

We describe a single framework in which to view the end-to-end-independently-verifiable (E2E) polling-place voting systems with a mixnet back-end. We use the framework to invent new systems that combine front and back-ends from existing systems.

This paper presents a method for adding end-to-end verifiability to any optical-scan vote counting system. A serial number and set of letters, paired with every candidate, are printed on each optical-scan ballot. The letter printed next to the candidate(...

Many electronic voting schemes assume the user votes with some computing device. This raises the question whether a voter can trust the device he is using. Three years ago, Chaum, and independently Neff, proposed what we call bare-handed electronic ...

We present a mathematical construct which provides a cryptographic protocol to verifiably shuffle a sequence of k modular integers, and discuss its application to secure, universally verifiable, multi-authority election schemes. The output of the ...