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Prophet Inequalities for I.I.D. Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution

Published: 17 June 2019 Publication History

Abstract

A central object in optimal stopping theory is the single-choice prophet inequality for independent, identically distributed random variables: given a sequence of random variables X1, ..., Xn drawn independently from a distribution F, the goal is to choose a stopping time τ so as to maximize α such that for all distributions F we have E[Xτ]≥α•E[maxt Xt]. What makes this problem challenging is that the decision whether τ=t may only depend on the values of the random variables X1, ..., Xt and on the distribution F. For a long time the best known bound for the problem had been α≥1-1/e≅0.632, but quite recently a tight bound of α≅0.745 was obtained. The case where F is unknown, such that the decision whether τ=t may depend only on the values of the random variables X1, ..., Xt, is equally well motivated but has received much less attention. A straightforward guarantee for this case of α≥1-1/e≅0.368 can be derived from the solution to the secretary problem, where an arbitrary set of values arrive in random order and the goal is to maximize the probability of selecting the largest value. We show that this bound is in fact tight. We then investigate the case where the stopping time may additionally depend on a limited number of samples from~F, and show that even with o(n) samples α≥1/e. On the other hand, n samples allow for a significant improvement, while O(n2) samples are equivalent to knowledge of the distribution: specifically, with n samples α≥1-1/e≅0.632 and α≥ln(2)≅0.693, and with O(n2) samples α≥0.745-ε for any ε>0.

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cover image ACM Conferences
EC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 2019
947 pages
ISBN:9781450367929
DOI:10.1145/3328526
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 17 June 2019

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  1. posted pricing
  2. prophet inequalities

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EC '19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 24 - 28, 2019
AZ, Phoenix, USA

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EC '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 106 of 382 submissions, 28%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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  • (2023)Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and AugmentationsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/3623273Online publication date: 8-Sep-2023
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