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Network measurement methods for locating and examining censorship devices

Authors:

Ram Sundara Raman,

Jonathan Mayer,

Roya EnsafiAuthors Info & Claims

CoNEXT '22: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies

Pages 18 - 34

https://doi.org/10.1145/3555050.3569133

Published: 30 November 2022 Publication History

Abstract

Advances in networking and firewall technology have led to the emergence of network censorship devices that can perform large-scale, highly-performant content blocking. While such devices have proliferated, techniques to locate, identify, and understand them are still limited, require cumbersome manual effort, and are developed on a case-by-case basis.

In this paper, we build robust, general-purpose methods to understand various aspects of censorship devices, and study devices deployed in 4 countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia). We develop a censorship traceroute method, CenTrace, that automatically identifies the network location of censorship devices. We use banner grabs to identify vendors from potential censorship devices. To collect more features about the devices themselves, we build a censorship fuzzer, CenFuzz, that uses various HTTP request and TLS Client Hello fuzzing strategies to examine the rules and triggers of censorship devices. Finally, we use features collected using these methods to cluster censorship devices and explore device characteristics across deployments.

Using CenTrace measurements, we find that censorship devices are often deployed in ISPs upstream to clients, sometimes even in other countries. Using data from banner grabs and injected block-pages, we identify 23 commercial censorship device deployments in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. We observe that certain CenFuzz strategies such as using a different HTTP method succeed in evading a large portion of these censorship devices, and observe that devices manufactured by the same vendors have similar evasion behavior using clustering. The methods developed in this paper apply consistently and rapidly across a wide range of censorship devices and enable continued understanding and monitoring of censorship devices around the world.

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Cited By

Xing YLu CLiu BDuan HSun JLi ZVallina-Rodríguez NSuarez-Tángil GLevin DPelsser C(2024)Yesterday Once More: Global Measurement of Internet Traffic Shadowing BehaviorsProceedings of the 2024 ACM on Internet Measurement Conference10.1145/3646547.3689023(230-240)Online publication date: 4-Nov-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3646547.3689023
Wang QChen JJiang ZGuo RLiu XZhang CDuan H(2024)Break the Wall from Bottom: Automated Discovery of Protocol-Level Evasion Vulnerabilities in Web Application Firewalls2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00129(185-202)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP54263.2024.00129
Amich AEshete BYegneswaran VHoang NCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)DeResistorProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620384(2617-2633)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620384
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Network measurement methods for locating and examining censorship devices
1. General and reference
  1. Cross-computing tools and techniques
    1. Measurement
2. Social and professional topics
  1. Computing / technology policy
    1. Censorship
      1. Technology and censorship

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cover image ACM Conferences

CoNEXT '22: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies

November 2022

431 pages

ISBN:9781450395083

DOI:10.1145/3555050

General Chairs:
Giuseppe Bianchi
University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy
,
Alessandro Mei
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy

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Published: 30 November 2022

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CoNEXT '22: The 18th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies

December 6 - 9, 2022

Roma, Italy

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Cited By

Xing YLu CLiu BDuan HSun JLi ZVallina-Rodríguez NSuarez-Tángil GLevin DPelsser C(2024)Yesterday Once More: Global Measurement of Internet Traffic Shadowing BehaviorsProceedings of the 2024 ACM on Internet Measurement Conference10.1145/3646547.3689023(230-240)Online publication date: 4-Nov-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3646547.3689023
Wang QChen JJiang ZGuo RLiu XZhang CDuan H(2024)Break the Wall from Bottom: Automated Discovery of Protocol-Level Evasion Vulnerabilities in Web Application Firewalls2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00129(185-202)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP54263.2024.00129
Amich AEshete BYegneswaran VHoang NCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)DeResistorProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620384(2617-2633)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620384
Hilal FGasser O(2023)Yarrpbox: Detecting Middleboxes at Internet-ScaleProceedings of the ACM on Networking10.1145/35952901:CoNEXT1(1-23)Online publication date: 5-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3595290
Niere NHebrok SSomorovsky JMerget RMeng WJensen CCremers CKirda E(2023)Poster: Circumventing the GFW with TLS Record FragmentationProceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3576915.3624372(3528-3530)Online publication date: 15-Nov-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3576915.3624372

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