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SecQuant: Quantifying Container System Call Exposure

Published: 26 September 2022 Publication History

Abstract

Despite their maturity and popularity, security remains a critical concern in container adoption. To address this concern, secure container runtimes have emerged, offering superior guest isolation, as well as host protection, via system call policing through the surrogate kernel layer. Whether or not an adversary can bypass this protection depends on the effectiveness of the system call policy being enforced by the container runtime. In this work, we propose a novel method to quantify this container system call exposure. Our technique combines the analysis of a large number of exploit codes with comprehensive experiments designed to uncover the syscall pass-through behaviors of container runtimes. Our exploit code analysis uses information retrieval techniques to rank system calls by their risk weights. Our study shows that secure container runtimes are about 4.2 to 7.5 times more secure than others, using our novel quantification metric. We additionally uncover changing security trends across a 4.5 year version history of the container runtimes.

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Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Protect the System Call, Protect (Most of) the World with BASTIONProceedings of the 28th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 310.1145/3582016.3582066(528-541)Online publication date: 25-Mar-2023
  • (2023)Securing Container-based Clouds with Syscall-aware SchedulingProceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3579856.3582835(812-826)Online publication date: 10-Jul-2023

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Information

Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings
Computer Security – ESORICS 2022: 27th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Copenhagen, Denmark, September 26–30, 2022, Proceedings, Part II
Sep 2022
753 pages
ISBN:978-3-031-17145-1
DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-17146-8

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 26 September 2022

Author Tags

  1. Secure container runtime
  2. Security quantification
  3. System call
  4. Container escape
  5. Exploit code analysis

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View all
  • (2023)Protect the System Call, Protect (Most of) the World with BASTIONProceedings of the 28th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 310.1145/3582016.3582066(528-541)Online publication date: 25-Mar-2023
  • (2023)Securing Container-based Clouds with Syscall-aware SchedulingProceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3579856.3582835(812-826)Online publication date: 10-Jul-2023

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