article

Symbol Grounding in Computational Systems: A Paradox of Intentions

Author:

Vincent C. MüllerAuthors Info & Claims

Minds and Machines, Volume 19, Issue 4

Pages 529 - 541

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-009-9175-1

Published: 01 November 2009 Publication History

Abstract

The paper presents a paradoxical feature of computational systems that suggests that computationalism cannot explain symbol grounding. If the mind is a digital computer, as computationalism claims, then it can be computing either over meaningful symbols or over meaningless symbols. If it is computing over meaningful symbols its functioning presupposes the existence of meaningful symbols in the system, i.e. it implies semantic nativism. If the mind is computing over meaningless symbols, no intentional cognitive processes are available prior to symbol grounding. In this case, no symbol grounding could take place since any grounding presupposes intentional cognitive processes. So, whether computing in the mind is over meaningless or over meaningful symbols, computationalism implies semantic nativism.

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Cited By

Muller V(2010)Interaction and resistanceProceedings of the Third COST 2102 international training school conference on Toward autonomous, adaptive, and context-aware multimodal interfaces: theoretical and practical issues10.5555/1950280.1950282(1-7)Online publication date: 15-Mar-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1950280.1950282

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cover image Minds and Machines

Minds and Machines Volume 19, Issue 4

November 2009

111 pages

ISSN:0924-6495

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Copyright © Copyright © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

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Kluwer Academic Publishers

United States

Publication History

Published: 01 November 2009

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Cited By

Muller V(2010)Interaction and resistanceProceedings of the Third COST 2102 international training school conference on Toward autonomous, adaptive, and context-aware multimodal interfaces: theoretical and practical issues10.5555/1950280.1950282(1-7)Online publication date: 15-Mar-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1950280.1950282

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