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Strategic classification is causal modeling in disguise

AUTHORs:

Moritz HardtAuthors Info & Claims

ICML'20: Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning

Article No.: 642, Pages 6917 - 6926

Published: 13 July 2020 Publication History

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Abstract

Consequential decision-making incentivizes individuals to strategically adapt their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. While a long line of work has viewed strategic adaptation as gaming and attempted to mitigate its effects, recent work has instead sought to design classifiers that incentivize individuals to improve a desired quality. Key to both accounts is a cost function that dictates which adaptations are rational to undertake. In this work, we develop a causal framework for strategic adaptation. Our causal perspective clearly distinguishes between gaming and improvement and reveals an important obstacle to incentive design. We prove any procedure for designing classifiers that incentivize improvement must inevitably solve a non-trivial causal inference problem. We show a similar result holds for designing cost functions that satisfy the requirements of previous work. With the benefit of hindsight, our results show much of the prior work on strategic classification is causal modeling in disguise.

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Cited By

Lechner TUrner RBen-David SKrause ABrunskill ECho KEngelhardt BSabato SScarlett J(2023)Strategic classification with unknown user manipulationsProceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning10.5555/3618408.3619181(18714-18732)Online publication date: 23-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3618408.3619181
Emelianov VGast NLoiseau PPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic CandidatesProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538287(375-403)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538287
Finocchiaro JMaio RMonachou FPatro GRaghavan MStoica ATsirtsis S(2021)Bridging Machine Learning and Mechanism Design towards Algorithmic FairnessProceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency10.1145/3442188.3445912(489-503)Online publication date: 3-Mar-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3442188.3445912
Show More Cited By

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cover image Guide Proceedings

ICML'20: Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning

July 2020

11702 pages

Editors:
Hal Daumé,
Aarti Singh

Copyright © 2020.

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JMLR.org

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Published: 13 July 2020

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Cited By

Lechner TUrner RBen-David SKrause ABrunskill ECho KEngelhardt BSabato SScarlett J(2023)Strategic classification with unknown user manipulationsProceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning10.5555/3618408.3619181(18714-18732)Online publication date: 23-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3618408.3619181
Emelianov VGast NLoiseau PPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic CandidatesProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538287(375-403)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538287
Finocchiaro JMaio RMonachou FPatro GRaghavan MStoica ATsirtsis S(2021)Bridging Machine Learning and Mechanism Design towards Algorithmic FairnessProceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency10.1145/3442188.3445912(489-503)Online publication date: 3-Mar-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3442188.3445912
Rosenfeld NHilgard SRavindranath SParkes DLarochelle HRanzato MHadsell RBalcan MLin H(2020)From predictions to decisionsProceedings of the 34th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3495724.3496070(4115-4126)Online publication date: 6-Dec-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3495724.3496070

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