Authors:
Jason Reeves
and
Sean Smith
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College, United States
Keyword(s):
Tamper Detection, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber-Physical Systems.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Critical Infrastructure Protection
;
Information and Systems Security
;
Intrusion Detection & Prevention
Abstract:
Embedded devices installed as part of the smart grid rollout present a major dilemma for grid defenders,
because they are soft targets that could allow an attacker to access critical assets (generators, control centers,
etc.) deeper in the utility’s network. While both physical tampering and intrusion protection are large, well-studied
fields, state-of-the-art protection schemes suffer from several flaws: They are not powerful enough
to respond properly to different tamper events, their severe responses can lead to reduced grid availability,
and they often require more setup resources than a utility operator can provide. To protect these networks,
we present TEDDI (Tamper Event Detection on Distributed Infrastructure), a distributed, sensor-based tamper
protection architecture for embedded devices on utility networks. TEDDI uses data gathered from across
the network to make more-informed and more-accurate tamper decisions, and can customize its response
based on the event it
sees. It can also be configured and installed quickly, without needing a large base of
knowledge beforehand. In this paper, we lay out the TEDDI architecture, and discuss how TEDDI solves the
grid defender’s dilemma better than current work.
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