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Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games

Authors Anja Rey, Jörg Rothe

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Anja Rey
Jörg Rothe

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Anja Rey and Jörg Rothe. Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games. In 41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 58, pp. 80:1-80:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.80

Abstract

Inspired by the study of control scenarios in elections and complementing manipulation and bribery settings in cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce the notion of structural control in weighted voting games. We model two types of influence, adding players to and deleting players from a game, with goals such as increasing a given player's Shapley-Shubik or probabilistic Penrose-Banzhaf index in relation to the original game. We study the computational complexity of the problems of whether such structural changes can achieve the desired effect.

Subject Classification

Keywords
  • algorithmic games theory
  • weighted voting games
  • structural control
  • power indices
  • computational complexity

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