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Dynamic Malware Analysis in the Modern Era—A State of the Art Survey

Published: 13 September 2019 Publication History

Abstract

Although malicious software (malware) has been around since the early days of computers, the sophistication and innovation of malware has increased over the years. In particular, the latest crop of ransomware has drawn attention to the dangers of malicious software, which can cause harm to private users as well as corporations, public services (hospitals and transportation systems), governments, and security institutions. To protect these institutions and the public from malware attacks, malicious activity must be detected as early as possible, preferably before it conducts its harmful acts. However, it is not always easy to know what to look for—especially when dealing with new and unknown malware that has never been seen. Analyzing a suspicious file by static or dynamic analysis methods can provide relevant and valuable information regarding a file's impact on the hosting system and help determine whether the file is malicious or not, based on the method's predefined rules. While various techniques (e.g., code obfuscation, dynamic code loading, encryption, and packing) can be used by malware writers to evade static analysis (including signature-based anti-virus tools), dynamic analysis is robust to these techniques and can provide greater understanding regarding the analyzed file and consequently can lead to better detection capabilities. Although dynamic analysis is more robust than static analysis, existing dynamic analysis tools and techniques are imperfect, and there is no single tool that can cover all aspects of malware behavior. The most recent comprehensive survey performed in this area was published in 2012. Since that time, the computing environment has changed dramatically with new types of malware (ransomware, cryptominers), new analysis methods (volatile memory forensics, side-channel analysis), new computing environments (cloud computing, IoT devices), new machine-learning algorithms, and more. The goal of this survey is to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of existing methods used to dynamically analyze malware, which includes a description of each method, its strengths and weaknesses, and its resilience against malware evasion techniques. In addition, we include an overview of prominent studies presenting the usage of machine-learning methods to enhance dynamic malware analysis capabilities aimed at detection, classification, and categorization.

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  1. Dynamic Malware Analysis in the Modern Era—A State of the Art Survey

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      Massimiliano Masi

      Malware is a problem. Its spreading within industrial networks and critical infrastructures shows that there is an always increasing need for cybersecurity expertise to detect, protect, and react to infections. Unfortunately, analyzing how malware attacks a network can be an extremely complex task for a small team of cybersecurity specialists. Attackers can be highly motivated and can potentially have unlimited resources (in the worst cases). Typically, malware is either statically or dynamically analyzed. However, malware writers can use "various techniques ... to evade static analysis" and "dynamic analysis tools ... are imperfect." As the article states: "there is no single tool that cover[s] all aspects of malware behavior." In this survey, the authors provide a taxonomy for the malware, for the behavior of the malware, for how the malware analysis can be done, and for the techniques and tools available to perform it. The article concludes with a matrix summarizing malware behavior and correlations with layout and techniques. Such classifications can tremendously help malware analysts choose the best analysis strategy. Chief information security officers (CISOs), security information and event management (SIEM), and security operations center (SOC) practitioners will benefit from reading this article, as it provides insight into the techniques of both malware authors and malware analysts.

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      cover image ACM Computing Surveys
      ACM Computing Surveys  Volume 52, Issue 5
      September 2020
      791 pages
      ISSN:0360-0300
      EISSN:1557-7341
      DOI:10.1145/3362097
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      • Sartaj Sahni
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      Publication History

      Published: 13 September 2019
      Accepted: 01 May 2019
      Revised: 01 April 2019
      Received: 01 November 2018
      Published in CSUR Volume 52, Issue 5

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      Author Tags

      1. Dynamic analysis
      2. behavioral analysis
      3. detection
      4. evasion
      5. malware

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