Article

High-order punishment and the evolution of cooperation

Authors:

Bastian Baranski,

Thomas Bartz-Beielstein,

Rüdiger Ehlers,

Thusinthan Kajendran,

Marc ZimmermannAuthors Info & Claims

GECCO '06: Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation

Pages 379 - 380

https://doi.org/10.1145/1143997.1144065

Published: 08 July 2006 Publication History

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Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates that high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation.

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R. A. Hammond and R. Axelrod. Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive. http://www-personal.umich.edu/ axe/. Cited January, 25th 2006.

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Cited By

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Jaffe K(2016)Synergy Drives the Evolutionary Dynamics in Biology and EconomicsFirst Complex Systems Digital Campus World E-Conference 201510.1007/978-3-319-45901-1_34(311-331)Online publication date: 26-Dec-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45901-1_34
Sigmund KHauert CTraulsen ADe Silva H(2010)Social Control and the Social Contract: The Emergence of Sanctioning Systems for Collective ActionDynamic Games and Applications10.1007/s13235-010-0001-41:1(149-171)Online publication date: 7-Oct-2010
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4
Knoester DMcKinley PBeckmann BOfria C(2007)Directed Evolution of Communication and Cooperation in Digital OrganismsAdvances in Artificial Life10.1007/978-3-540-74913-4_39(384-394)Online publication date: 2007
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74913-4_39
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Published In

GECCO '06: Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation

July 2006

2004 pages

ISBN:1595931864

DOI:10.1145/1143997

General Chair:
Mike Cattolico
Tiger Mountain Scientific, Inc., USA

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 08 July 2006

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GECCO06

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GECCO06: Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference

July 8 - 12, 2006

Washington, Seattle, USA

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GECCO '06 Paper Acceptance Rate 205 of 446 submissions, 46%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,669 of 4,410 submissions, 38%

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Cited By

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Jaffe K(2016)Synergy Drives the Evolutionary Dynamics in Biology and EconomicsFirst Complex Systems Digital Campus World E-Conference 201510.1007/978-3-319-45901-1_34(311-331)Online publication date: 26-Dec-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45901-1_34
Sigmund KHauert CTraulsen ADe Silva H(2010)Social Control and the Social Contract: The Emergence of Sanctioning Systems for Collective ActionDynamic Games and Applications10.1007/s13235-010-0001-41:1(149-171)Online publication date: 7-Oct-2010
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4
Knoester DMcKinley PBeckmann BOfria C(2007)Directed Evolution of Communication and Cooperation in Digital OrganismsAdvances in Artificial Life10.1007/978-3-540-74913-4_39(384-394)Online publication date: 2007
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74913-4_39
Jaffe K(undefined)Extended Inclusive Fitness Theory Bridges Economics and Biology Through a Common Understanding of Social SynergySSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.2600254
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2600254

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Index Terms

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Severe Punishment for Those Who Were Caught

Combined effect of pure punishment and reward in the public goods game

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