Abstract
The problem of cooperation among selfish nodes in ad hoc networks has gained recently a considerable attention. In this paper we propose a dynamic game theoretical model of cooperation in ad hoc networks, based on evolutionary game theory. Our model enables us to make predictions about possible equilibrium points of the network composed of the selfish and learning nodes, which can dynamically adjust their strategy in order to maximize their own payoff. In particular, we show that if an ad hoc network implements a reputation mechanism, all long term equilibrium points of the system will include cooperating nodes. In fact, in most of the equilibrium points, the cooperators will constitute a majority of the nodes. We believe that this new approach, borrowing from biological research, can have broader applications for studying dynamics of distributed communication systems.
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Wrona, K., Mähönen, P. Analytical Model of Cooperation in Ad Hoc Networks. Telecommunication Systems 27, 347–369 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:TELS.0000041015.43191.40
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:TELS.0000041015.43191.40