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An Eigentrust dynamic evolutionary model in P2P file-sharing systems

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Abstract

Many reputation systems have been proposed to distinguish malicious peers and to ensure the quality of the service in P2P file sharing systems. Most of those reputation systems implicitly assumed that normal peers are always altruistic and provide their resources unconditionally when requested. However, as independent decision makers in real networks, peers can be completely altruistic (always cooperative, ALLC), purely selfish (always defective, ALLD), or reciprocal (R). In addition, those systems do not provide an effective method to reduce free-riders in P2P networks. To address these two problems, in this paper, we propose an EigenTrust evolutionary game model based on the renowned EigenTrust reputation model. In our model, we use evolutionary game theory to model strategic peers and their transaction behaviors, which is close to the realistic scenario. Many experiments have been designed and performed to study the evolution of strategies and the emergence of cooperation under our proposed EigenTrust evolutionary model. The simulation results showed that rational users are inclined to cooperate (enthusiastically provide resources to other peers) even under some conditions in which malicious peers try to destroy the system.

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Acknowledgments

This work is supported by Nature Science Foundation of China (61272173, 61403059, 61572095).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, Liaoning Province, China

    Kun Lu, Junlong Wang & Mingchu Li

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  1. Kun Lu
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  2. Junlong Wang
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  3. Mingchu Li
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Correspondence to Mingchu Li.

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Lu, K., Wang, J. & Li, M. An Eigentrust dynamic evolutionary model in P2P file-sharing systems. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 9, 599–612 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-015-0416-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-015-0416-1

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