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Die Sicherheit von MS CardSpace und verwandten Single-Sign-On-Protokollen

Browser-basierte Protokolle im Sicherheitscheck

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  • Security-Desaster
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Zusammenfassung

Trotz vieler technischer Verbesserungen basiert die Sicherheit von Browser-basierten Single-Sign-On-Protokollen immer noch essentiell, entscheidend auf der „Same Origin Policy“ des Browsers. Daher können durch Angriffe auf das Domain Name System (DNS) auch moderne Verfahren wie Microsoft CardSpace erfolgreich angegriffen werden, wie der folgende Beitrag eindrucksvoll zeigt.

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Literatur

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IT-Sicherheit an der Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Xuan Chen & Christoph Löhr

  2. Horst-Görtz-Institut, Kryptografische Protokolle, Sicherheit, Germany

    Sebastian Gajek & Sven Schäge

Authors
  1. Xuan Chen
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  2. Christoph Löhr
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  3. Sebastian Gajek
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  4. Sven Schäge
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xuan Chen.

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Chen, X., Löhr, C., Gajek, S. et al. Die Sicherheit von MS CardSpace und verwandten Single-Sign-On-Protokollen. DuD 32, 515–519 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-008-0123-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-008-0123-7

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