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An incentive-compatible mechanism for efficient distribution of bulk contents on peer-to-peer networks

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Abstract

In recent years, the rapid growth of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks has provided a new paradigm for content distribution. To improve the efficiency of a P2P system, it is important to provide incentives for the peers to participate and contribute their resources. Various attempts have been made to reward/penalize peers by providing service differentiation based on a requesting peer’s history or reputation. However, in a truly distributed, non-cooperative environment, maintaining and preventing the untruthful revealing of such information within the community impose larger computation and communication overheads to the system. These problems are further magnified when large-volume contents are being distributed because of the length distribution processes and the update of history or reputation has to keep up with the distribution process. In this paper, we address the incentive provisioning problem for distribution of large-volume content in P2P networks, and present a “seeing-is-believing” incentive-compatible mechanism (protocol) in which a peer will decide how much resources will be assigned to which neighbors based on what it has experienced. The protocol applies a utility-based resource-trading concept where peers will maximize their contributions for a fair or better return, and we show that by adopting this protocol, the system will achieve Cournot Equilibrium. Furthermore, our protocol is lightweight, completely decentralized, and cheat-proof. Experimental results illustrate significant improvements on the distribution efficiency of our protocol over other adopted alternatives.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, 92110, USA

    Simon G. M. Koo

  2. School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA

    C. S. George Lee

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  1. Simon G. M. Koo
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  2. C. S. George Lee
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Correspondence to Simon G. M. Koo.

Additional information

Simon G. M. Koo is currently an Assistant Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science at the University of San Diego. H received his B. Eng. (Hons) in Information Engineering from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1997, M.S.E.E. from Polytechnic University, Brooklyn, in 1999, M.S. in Operations Research from Columbia University, NY, in 2001, and his Ph.D. from the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, in 2005. His current research include peer-to-peer networks, distributed mechanism design, performance modeling, and location-aware wireless applications. He is a member of IEEE, ACM and Sigma Xi. He is also listed in Who's Who of Emerging Leaders in 2007.

C. S. George Lee received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering from Washington State University in 1973 and 1974, respectively, and the PhD degree from Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN in 1978.In 1978–1979, he taught at Purdue University, and in 1979–1985, at the University of Michigan. Since 1985, he has been with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University, where he is currently Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering.His current research focuses on humanoid robotics, distributed mobile robots, and neuro-fuzzy systems. He has authored or co-authored over 150 publications in these areas, in addition to 20 book chapters and two graduate textbooks. Dr. Lee was an IEEE Computer Society Distinguished Visitor in 1983–1986, the Organizer and Chairman of the 1988 NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Sensor-Based Robots: Algorithms and Architectures. He also served as Secretary and Vice-President for Technical Affairs of the IEEE Robotics and Automation Society (RAS) in 1988–1990 and 1990–1995, respectively. He was Program Chair of the 1996 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation in Minneapolis, MN and the 1998 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems in Victoria, B.C., Canada. Dr. Lee served as an Administrative Committee member and a Distinguished Lecturer of the IEEE RAS, and the General Chair of the 2003 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems held in Las Vegas, Nevada, on October 26–31, 2003. He currently serves as General Co-Chair of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation to be held in Orlando, Florida, on May 15–19, 2006. Dr. Lee has directed over 20 Ph.D. dissertations. He is an IEEE Fellow and a recipient of the IEEE Third Millennium Medal Award.

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Koo, S.G.M., Lee, C.S.G. An incentive-compatible mechanism for efficient distribution of bulk contents on peer-to-peer networks. Telecommun Syst 34, 81–90 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-006-9021-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-006-9021-1

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