Abstract
Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain specificity is, based on the intuitive idea that a domain specific mechanism is restricted in the kind of information that it processes, and show that each fails at least one of those constraints.
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One might be tempted to cheat here by having a disjunctive notion—with one disjunct applying to input-output modules and the other applying to Central System ones. Arguably, this would run afoul of the requirement of providing genuine insight, by rendering the notion largely vacuous. Regardless, let us agree that disjunctive notions are not allowed.
A similar conclusion on completely different grounds has been put forward by Peter Carruthers (2006, p. 6).
Talk of “function” in the modularity literature is ambiguous. Sometimes, it aims to be in tune with the evolutionary biological sense of selected or proper “function” (Millikan 1984). In evolutionary biology, an organ’s proper or selected function is whatever it was naturally selected to do. “If an organ has been naturally differentially selected-for by virtue of something it does, we can say that the reason the organ is there is that it does that something.” (Wright 1973, p. 46). Other times, cognitive talk of “function” is much looser, meaning nothing but the mechanism’s typical effects (Cummins 1975). This is the sense in which FP and CP identify domain specificity and specialized function, and it is also the way Fodor uses the word “function” to individuate modules in (1983). Notice, however, that taking a mechanism to be domain-specific if it exhibits a proper biological function would not satisfy our constraints either. After all, evolution might still have selected an all purpose system like Fodor’s putative central system. It is an empirically open question whether or not it did, but either is conceptually possible. Fodor’s central system, if selected for, therefore, would have a proper function. But Fodor’s central module is the paradigmatic non-domain-specific mental mechanism. Thus, it is possible for a mechanism to have a specific proper function, yet not be domain specific. This shows that having a specific proper function would fail to exclude non-domain specific mechanisms like Fodor’s central processor. Therefore, to have a specific proper function cannot be what it is required for a mental mechanism to be domain specific either.
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Acknowledgments
Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas in Mexico City; at the Second Workshop on Context and Content, hosted by the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; and at the University of London’s Institute for Philosophy. We are grateful to all three audiences for very insightful suggestions. We would like to single out Laura Danón, Barry Smith, Virginia Vallian, and Jonny McIntosh for truly penetrating objections that led to significant improvements.
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Barceló Aspeitia, A.A., Eraña, Á. & Stainton, R. The Contribution of Domain Specificity in the Highly Modular Mind. Minds & Machines 20, 19–27 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9183-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9183-1