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Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue

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Abstract

The coordination of strategies in a cooperative game, when some players decide to act together, is the basis of the partnership notion. Nevertheless, in some situations, it may be more convenient to form an effective coalition or alliance.

In this work, we consider the Banzhaf semivalue and use it to discuss the convenience to form either partnerships or alliances, especially in simple games. Throughout the paper, some mathematical properties of the Banzhaf semivalue, in relation with the partnership formation, are derived.

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Correspondence to M. Dolors Llongueras.

Additional information

Research of A. Magaña is partially supported by Grant MTM 2006–06064 of the Education and Science Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund, and Grant SGR 2005–00651 of the Catalonia Government.

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Llongueras, M.D., Magaña, A. Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue. Ann Oper Res 158, 63–79 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0245-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0245-6

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