Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

Skip to main content
Log in

Comparing variants of strategic ability: how uncertainty and memory influence general properties of games

  • Published:
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a modal logic that allows to reason about agents’ abilities in game-like scenarios. Semantic variants of ATL are usually built upon different assumptions about the kind of game that is played, including capabilities of agents (perfect vs. imperfect information, perfect vs. imperfect memory, etc.). ATL has been studied extensively in previous years; however, most of the research focused on model checking. Studies of other decision problems (e.g., satisfiability) and formal meta-properties of the logic (like axiomatization or expressivity) have been relatively scarce, and mostly limited to the basic variant of ATL where agents possess perfect information and perfect memory. In particular, a comparison between different semantic variants of the logic is largely left untouched. In this paper, we show that different semantics of ability in ATL give rise to different validity sets. The issue is important for several reasons. First, many logicians identify a logic with its set of true sentences. As a consequence, we prove that different notions of ability induce different strategic logics. Secondly, we show that different concepts of ability induce different general properties of games. Thirdly, the study can be seen as the first systematic step towards satisfiability-checking algorithms for ATL with imperfect information. We introduce sophisticated unfoldings of models and prove invariance results that are an important technical contribution to formal analysis of strategic logics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9
Fig. 10
Fig. 11
Fig. 12
Fig. 13
Fig. 14

Similar content being viewed by others

Explore related subjects

Discover the latest articles, news and stories from top researchers in related subjects.

Notes

  1. Note that “always” is not definable from “until” in ATL [48], and has to be added explicitly to the language.

  2. We would like to note that it is essential for this work that we do not require a finite set of states or actions. We give a more detailed discussion in Sect. 2.3.

  3. An interested reader may observe that the preliminary versions of the semantics (in alternating transition systems) did not assume models explicitly to be finite [7, 8]. However, the authors de facto considered only finite models since they were solely interested in the model checking problem, where the input must be finite.

  4. We thank an anonymous JAAMAS reviewer for suggesting this.

  5. As commonly done we assume an implicit order on the elements in \({\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \) allowing to conveniently represent collective strategies as tuples. In our setting where agents are represented by natural numbers the order is apparent. In the general case, a collective strategy for \(A\) is a function that associates individual strategies to the agents in \(A\).

  6. The issue is closely related to epistemic feasibility of plans, cf. e.g. [22, 49].

  7. The proof in [31] was for the class of finitely branching \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\) (with possibly infinite state spaces) but it extends to the case of infinite branching in a straightforward way.

  8. The equivalence of \(\mathfrak{M },q\models _{_{{{ IR }}}}\varphi \) and \(T(\mathfrak{M },q),q\models _{_{{{ IR }}}}\varphi \) follows also from the results on alternating bisimulation, cf. [10] for the bisimulation in finite models, and [3] for the general case. We present the construction nevertheless, as it will be adapted in the following sections to the case of imperfect information.

  9. We thank an anonymous reviewer of JAAMAS for the excellent terminological suggestion. An \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}}\) unfolding is not a tree, as it usually consists of several transition trees. On the other hand, it is not a typical forest because the trees are not separate—they are intimately connected by epistemic relations. For the biological Pando, see for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pando(tree).

  10. The example depicts some simple traps that await a married man if he happens to be absent-minded. If he doesn’t kiss his wife in the morning, he is likely to make her angry. However, if he kisses her more than once, she might get suspicious. It is easy to see that the absent-minded (i.e., memoryless) husband does not have a strategy to survive safely through the morning, though a safe path through the model does exist (\(\lambda =q_0q_1q_1q_1\ldots \)).

References

  1. Ågotnes, T. (2004). A note on syntactic characterization of incomplete information in ATEL. In Proceedings of the workshop on knowledge and games, Liverpool (pp. 34–42).

  2. Ågotnes, T. (2006). Action and knowledge in alternating-time temporal logic. Synthese, 149(2), 377–409.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Ågotnes, T., Goranko, V., & Jamroga, W. (2007). Alternating-time temporal logics with irrevocable strategies. In D. Samet (Ed.), Proceedings of TARK XI (pp. 15–24).

  4. Ågotnes, T., & Walther, D. (2009). A logic of strategic ability under bounded memory. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 18(1), 55–77.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Alechina, N., Logan, B., Nga, N. H., & Rakib, A. (2009). A logic for coalitions with bounded resources. In Proceedings of IJCAI (pp. 659–664).

  6. Alechina, N., Logan, B., Nga, N. H., & Rakib, A. (2010). Resource-bounded alternating-time temporal logic. In Proceedings of AAMAS (pp. 481–488).

  7. Alur, R., Henzinger, T. A., & Kupferman, O. (1997). Alternating-time temporal logic. In Proceedings of the 38th annual symposium on foundations of computer science (FOCS) (pp. 100–109). Los Alamitos: IEEE Computer Society Press.

  8. Alur, R., Henzinger, T. A., & Kupferman, O. (1998). Alternating-time temporal logic. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1536, 23–60.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Alur, R., Henzinger, T. A., & Kupferman, O. (2002). Alternating-time temporal logic. Journal of the ACM, 49, 672–713.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  10. Alur, R., Henzinger, T. A., Kupferman, O., & Vardi, M. Y. (1998). Alternating refinement relations. In Proceedings of CONCUR, volume 1466 of LNCS (pp. 163–178).

  11. Brihaye, T., Da Costa Lopes, A., Laroussinie, F., & Markey, N. (2009). ATL with strategy contexts and bounded memory. In Proceedings of LFCS, volume 5407 of Lecture notes in computer science (pp. 92–106). New York: Springer.

  12. Bulling, N., & Dix, J. (2010). Modelling and verifying coalitions using argumentation and ATL. Inteligencia Artificial, Revista Iberoamericana de Inteligencia Artificial, 14(46), 45–73.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Bulling, N., Dix, J., & Jamroga, W. (2010). Model checking logics of strategic ability: Complexity. In M. Dastani, K. Hindriks, & J.-J. Meyer (Eds.), Specification and verification of multi-agent systems (pp. 125–159). New York: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Bulling, N., & Farwer, B. (2009). Expressing properties of resource-bounded systems: The logics RTL* and RTL. In Proceedings of CLIMA (pp. 22–45).

  15. Bulling, N., & Farwer, B. (2010). On the (un-)decidability of model checking resource-bounded agents. In Proceedings of ECAI, volume 215 of Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications (pp. 567–572). Amsterdam: IOS Press.

  16. Bulling, N., & Jamroga, W. (2009). What agents can probably enforce. Fundamenta Informaticae, 93(1–3), 81–96.

    MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  17. Bulling, N., & Jamroga, W. (2010). Verifying agents with memory is harder than it seemed. AI Communications, 23, 380–403.

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  18. Bulling, N., & Jamroga, W. (2011). Alternating epistemic mu-calculus. In Proceedings of IJCAI-11 (pp. 109–114).

  19. Bulling, N., Jamroga, W., & Dix, J. (2008). Reasoning about temporal properties of rational play. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 53(1–4), 51–114.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  20. Chatterjee, K., Henzinger, T. A., & Piterman, N. (2007). Strategy logic. In Proceedings of CONCUR (pp. 59–73).

  21. Clarke, E. M., & Emerson, E. A. (1981). Design and synthesis of synchronization skeletons using branching time temporal logic. In Proceedings of logics of programs workshop, volume 131 of Lecture notes in computer science (pp. 52–71).

  22. Davis, E. (1994). Knowledge preconditions for plans. Journal of Logic and Computation, 4(5), 721–766.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  23. Dima, C., Enea, C., & Guelev, D. P. (2010). Model-checking an alternating-time temporal logic with knowledge, imperfect information, perfect recall and communicating coalitions. In Proceedings of GANDALF (pp. 103–117).

  24. Dima, C., & Tiplea, F. L. (2011). Model-checking atl under imperfect information and perfect recall semantics is undecidable. CoRR, abs/1102.4225.

  25. Ghaderi, H., Levesque, H., & Lespérance, Y. (2007). A logical theory of coordination and joint ability. In Proceedings of AAAI’07 (pp. 421–426). Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.

  26. Goranko, V. (2001). Coalition games and alternating temporal logics. In J. van Benthem (Ed.), Proceedings of TARK VIII (pp. 259–272). San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann.

  27. Goranko, V., & Jamroga, W. (2004). Comparing semantics of logics for multi-agent systems. Synthese, 139(2), 241–280.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  28. Goranko, V., Jamroga, W., & Turrini, P. (2011). Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions. In Proceedings of AAMAS2011 (pp. 727–734).

  29. Goranko, V., Jamroga, W., & Turrini, P. (2013). Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent systems, 26(2), 288–314.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Goranko, V., & Shkatov, D. (2009). Tableau-based decision procedures for logics of strategic ability in multiagent systems. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 11(1), 1–48.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  31. Goranko, V., & van Drimmelen, G. (2006). Complete axiomatization and decidability of alternating-time temporal logic. Theoretical Computer Science, 353(1), 93–117.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  32. Guelev, D. P., Dima, C., & Enea, C. (2011). An alternating-time temporal logic with knowledge, perfect recall and past: Axiomatisation and model-checking. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 21(1), 93–131.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  33. Harding, A., Ryan, M., & Schobbens, P.-Y. (2002). Approximating ATL* in ATL. In VMCAI ’02: Revised papers from the third international workshop on verification, model checking, and abstract interpretation (pp. 289–301). New York: Springer.

  34. Hawke, P. (2010). Coordination, almost perfect information and strategic ability. In Proceedings of LAMAS.

  35. Jamroga, W. (2003). Some remarks on alternating temporal epistemic logic. In B. Dunin-Keplicz & R. Verbrugge (Eds.), Proceedings of formal approaches to multi-agent systems (FAMAS 2003) (pp. 133–140).

  36. Jamroga, W. (2006). On the relationship between playing rationally and knowing how to play: A logical account. In C. Freksa, M. Kohlhase, & K. Schill (Eds.), Proceedings of KI 2006, volume 4314 of Lecture notes in artificial intelligence (pp. 419–433). New York: Springer.

  37. Jamroga, W. (2008). A temporal logic for stochastic multi-agent systems. In Proceedings of PRIMA’08, volume 5357 of LNCS (pp. 239–250).

  38. Jamroga, W., & Ågotnes, T. (2006). Modular interpreted systems: A preliminary report. Technical report IfI-06-15, Clausthal University of Technology.

  39. Jamroga, W., & Ågotnes, T. (2007). Constructive knowledge: What agents can achieve under incomplete information. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 17(4), 423–475.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  40. Jamroga, W., & Bulling, N. (2010). Comparing variants of strategic ability. In Proceedings of EUMAS2010.

  41. Jamroga, W., & Bulling, N. (2011). Comparing variants of strategic ability. In Proceedings of IJCAI-11 (pp. 252–257).

  42. Jamroga, W., & Dix, J. (2008). Model checking abilities of agents: A closer look. Theory of Computing Systems, 42(3), 366–410.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  43. Jamroga, W., & van der Hoek, W. (2004). Agents that know how to play. Fundamenta Informaticae, 63(2–3), 185–219.

    MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  44. Jamroga, W., van der Hoek, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2005). Intentions and strategies in game-like scenarios. In C. Bento, A. Cardoso, & G. Dias (Eds.), Progress in artificial intelligence: Proceedings of EPIA 2005, volume 3808 of Lecture notes in artificial intelligence (pp. 512–523). New York: Springer.

  45. Jonker, G. (2003). Feasible strategies in alternating-time temporal epistemic logic. Master thesis, University of Utrecht.

  46. Kacprzak, M., & Penczek, W. (2004). Unbounded model checking for alternating-time temporal logic. In Proceedings of AAMAS-04.

  47. Köster, M., & Lohmann, P. (2011). Abstraction for model checking modular interpreted systems over ATL. In Proceedings of AAMAS (pp. 1129–1130).

  48. Laroussinie, F., Markey, N., & Oreiby, G. (2008). On the expressiveness and complexity of ATL. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 4, 7.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  49. Lesperance, Y., Levesque, H. J., Lin, F., & Scherl, R. B. (2000). Ability and knowing how in the situation calculus. Studia Logica, 66(1), 165–186.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  50. Mogavero, F., Murano, A., Perelli, G., & Vardi, M. Y. (2012). What makes ATL* decidable? A decidable fragment of strategy logic. In Proceedings of CONCUR (pp. 193–208).

  51. Mogavero, F., Murano, A., & Vardi, M. Y. (2010). Reasoning about strategies. In Proceedings of FSTTCS (pp. 133–144).

  52. Pauly, M. (2001). Logic for social software. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam.

  53. Pauly, M. (2002). A modal logic for coalitional power in games. Journal of Logic and Computation, 12(1), 149–166.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  54. Schewe, S. (2008). ATL* satisfiability is 2ExpTime-complete. In Proceedings of ICALP 2008, volume 5126 of Lecture notes in computer science (pp. 373–385). New York: Springer.

  55. Schnoor, H. (2010). Deciding epistemic and strategic properties of cryptographic protocols. Technical report tr_1012, Kiel University.

  56. Schnoor, H. (2010). Strategic planning for probabilistic games with incomplete information. In Proceedings of AAMAS’10 (pp. 1057–1064).

  57. Schobbens, P. Y. (2004). Alternating-time logic with imperfect recall. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 85(2), 82–93.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  58. van der Hoek, W., Jamroga, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2005). A logic for strategic reasoning. In Proceedings of AAMAS’05 (pp. 157–164).

  59. van der Hoek, W., Lomuscio, A., & Wooldridge, M. (2006). On the complexity of practical ATL model checking. In P. Stone & G. Weiss (Eds.), Proceedings of AAMAS’06 (pp. 201–208).

  60. van der Hoek, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2002). Tractable multiagent planning for epistemic goals. In C. Castelfranchi & W. L. Johnson (Eds.), Proceedings of the first international joint conference on autonomous agents and multi-agent systems (AAMAS-02) (pp. 1167–1174). New York: ACM Press.

  61. van der Hoek, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2003). Cooperation, knowledge and time: Alternating-time temporal epistemic logic and its applications. Studia Logica, 75(1), 125–157.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  62. van Otterloo, S., & Jonker, G. (2004). On epistemic temporal strategic logic. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, XX, 35–45. Proceedings of LCMAS’04.

  63. van Otterloo, S., van der Hoek, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2004). Preferences in game logics. In Proceedings of AAMAS-04 (pp. 152–159).

  64. Walther, D., Lutz, C., Wolter, F., & Wooldridge, M. (2006). ATL satisfiability is indeed EXPTIME-complete. Journal of Logic and Computation, 16(6), 765–787.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  65. Walther, D., van der Hoek, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2007). Alternating-time temporal logic with explicit strategies. In D. Samet (Ed.), Proceedings TARK XI (pp. 269–278). Leuven: Presses Universitaires de Louvain.

  66. Yadav, N., & Sardiña, S. (2012). Reasoning about agent programs using ATL-like logics. In Proceedings of JELIA (pp. 437–449).

Download references

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express their thanks to Jan Broersen for the argument that triggered this study, Valentin Goranko for discussions on (non-) validity of fixpoint properties in various semantics of ATL, and anonymous reviewers of EUMAS’10, IJCAI’11 and JAAMAS for their valuable remarks. Wojciech Jamroga acknowledges the support of the FNR (National Research Fund) Luxembourg under projects S-GAMES—C08/IS/03 and GALOT—INTER/DFG/12/06.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nils Bulling.

Appendix: Proofs

Appendix: Proofs

1.1 Proofs of Sect. 4.2

The following Lemma is obvious by the definition of \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} \)-tree unfoldings. It states that that nodes group indistinguishable in the tree unfolding are also group indistinguishable in the model if interpreted as histories.

Lemma 1

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\), \(h_1\) and \(h_2\) two nodes in its \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} \)-tree unfolding, and \(A\subseteq {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \) a group of agents. If \(h_1\sim ^{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}_A h_2\) then \(h_1\approx ^{\mathfrak{M }}_Ah_2\).

Moreover, we have that all histories indistinguishable in the model are also indistinguishable in the tree if only states reachable from the current state are considered.

Lemma 2

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\), \(A\subseteq {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \) and \(h\) a node in \({T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}\). Then, for all \(h_1,h_2\in \varLambda _{\mathfrak{M }}(last(h))\) we have that

$$\begin{aligned} if\;h_1\approx _A^\mathfrak{M }h_2\;then\; h(h_1[1,\infty ]) \sim ^{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}_A h(h_2[1,\infty ]). \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 2 For every i CGS \(\mathfrak{M }\), state \(q\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\), and \({{\varvec{ATL}}}^{*}\) -formula \(\varphi \) we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{M },q\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\varphi \text { iff } T_{o}(\mathfrak{M },q),q\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\varphi \text { iff } T_{o}(\mathfrak{M },q),q\models _{_{{{ {{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}}{\textit{r}} }}}}\varphi . \end{aligned}$$

Proof

We show that, for every node \(h\) in \(T_o (\mathfrak{M },q)\), it holds that \(\mathfrak{M },last(h)\models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} \varphi \) iff \(T_o (\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}}{\textit{r}}}\varphi \). Then, the claim follows by Propositions 4 and  5 and for \(h=q\). The proof is done by induction on the structure of \(\varphi \).

Base cases:

  • Propositional case: Straightforward.

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \) where \(\gamma \) contains no nested strategic modalities. “\(\Rightarrow \)”: Suppose that \(\mathfrak{M },last(h)\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \). So, there is an \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}}\)-strategy \(s_A\) such that

    $$\begin{aligned} (\star )\ \forall \lambda \in out_\mathfrak{M }(last(h),s_A): \mathfrak{M },\lambda \models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\gamma . \end{aligned}$$

    We construct the memoryless strategy \(s_A^{\prime }\) in \(T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)\) as follows: \(s_a^{\prime }(\hat{h}h^{\prime })=s_a(last(h)h^{\prime })\) for every \(a\in A\) and \(\hat{h}\) such that \(h\sim ^{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}_A\hat{h}\). For all other histories \(h^{\prime \prime }\) (which do not have the form \(\hat{h}h^{\prime }\)) we define \(s^{\prime }_a(h^{\prime \prime })\) arbitrarily but in a uniform way. It is easy to see that \(s_A^{\prime }\) is uniform: For two histories \(h_1=\hat{h}^{\prime }h^{\prime }\) and \(h_2=\hat{h}^{\prime \prime }h^{\prime \prime }\) with \(\hat{h}^{\prime }\sim _A^{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)} h\) and \(\hat{h}^{\prime \prime }\sim _A^{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)} h\) and \(h_1\sim ^{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}_Ah_2\) we have \(s^{\prime }_A(h_1)=s^{\prime }_A(h_2)\); for, \(h_1\sim ^{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}_Ah_2\) implies \(h_1\approx ^{\mathfrak{M }}_Ah_2\) (by Lemma 1) and thus \(s_A(last(h)h^{\prime })=s_A(last(h)h^{\prime \prime })\). By construction of \(s_A^{\prime }\) we have that

    $$\begin{aligned} last(h)q_1q_2\cdots \in out_\mathfrak{M }(last(h),s_A)\text { iff } (h)(hq_1)(hq_1q_2)\cdots \in out_{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}(h,s_A^{\prime }). \end{aligned}$$

    Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and by \((\star )\) we have \(T_o (\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}}{\textit{r}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \). \(\Leftarrow \): Suppose we have \(T_o(\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{_{{{ {{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}}{\textit{r}} }}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \). So there is an \({{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}}{\textit{r}} \)-strategy \(s_A\) such that

    $$\begin{aligned} (\star )\ \forall \lambda \in out_{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}(h,s_A): T_o(\mathfrak{M },q),\lambda \models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}}{\textit{r}}}\gamma . \end{aligned}$$

    We construct a witnessing \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} \)-strategy \(s_A^{\prime }\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\) as follows: \(s_a^{\prime }(\hat{h})=s_a(hh^{\prime })\) for every \(a\in A\) and \(\hat{h}\) such that \(last(h)h^{\prime }\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }\hat{h}\) and \(last(h)h^{\prime }\in \varLambda _{\mathfrak{M }}^{fin}(last(h))\). We define \(s_a^{\prime }\) arbitrarily for all other histories with the condition to assign the same actions to indistinguishable histories in \(\mathfrak{M }\). The definition of \(s_a^{\prime }\) does only take into account the subtree starting at \(h\). Then, by Lemma 2 we have that strategy \(s_A^{\prime }\) is uniform by construction. Note, that it may differ from \(s_A\) but only for histories which are not realizable given that the initial state is \({ last }(h)\). By construction of \(s_A^{\prime }\), we also have

    $$\begin{aligned} (h)(hq_1)(hq_1q_2)\cdots \in out_{T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)}(h,s_A)\text { iff } last(h)q_1q_2\cdots \in out_\mathfrak{M }(last(h),s^{\prime }_A). \end{aligned}$$

    Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and by \((\star )\) we have \(\mathfrak{M },last(h)\models _{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \).

Induction step:

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \psi _1\wedge \psi _2\). Straightforward.

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \lnot \psi \). \(\mathfrak{M },last(h)\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\lnot \psi \) iff not \(\mathfrak{M },last(h)\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\psi \) iff (by induction hypothesis) not \(T_o(\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\psi \) iff \(T_o(\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\lnot \psi \).

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \). By induction hypothesis we have for each history \(h\) in \(T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)\) and each strict state-subformula \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) of \(\gamma \) that \(\mathfrak{M },{ last }(h)\models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} \varphi ^{\prime }\) iff \(T_o (\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}}{\textit{r}}}\varphi ^{\prime }\). For any maximal strict subformula \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) of \(\varphi \) we label all states \(h\) in \(T_o(\mathfrak{M },q)\) and states \(last(h)\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\) with a new proposition \(\mathsf{{p} }_{\varphi ^{\prime }}\) iff \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) holds in this very state. Then, we replace each \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) in \(\varphi \) with proposition \(\mathsf{{p} }_{\varphi ^{\prime }}\). This yields a formula without nested modalities and the claim follows by induction.\(\square \)

1.2 Proofs of Sect. 4.3

In this section we give all details needed to prove Theorem 3. The structure of the proof is shown in Fig. 9.

The following lemma is essential to show that truth in \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} \)-pando-like models is insensitive to the type of available strategies (memoryless vs. perfect recall). The lemma is needed to show that a uniform perfect recall strategy in the pando-like model gives rise to a uniform memoryless strategy. Therefore, we have to show that two states which are indistinguishable in the model give rise to indistinguishable histories.

Lemma 3

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} \)-pando like i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\) and \(q,q_1,\hat{q}_1,q_2,\hat{q}_2\in { St } \) where \(q_i\) is reachable from \(\hat{q}_i\), i.e. \({{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_i,q_i)}}\ne \epsilon \), for \(i=1,2\). Moreover, let \(\hat{q}_1\sim _b^{\mathfrak{M }}q\sim _c^{\mathfrak{M }}\hat{q}_2\) for some \(b,c\in A\) and \(q_1\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }q_2\). Then, we have that \({{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\).

Fig. 15
figure 15

General setting of the proof of Proposition 7

Proof

The setting is illustrated in Fig. 15. In the following we consider all possibilities how \(q\), \(\hat{q}_1\), \(\hat{q}_2\), \(q_1\), and \(q_2\) can be located. We recall that \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(q^{\prime })}}=q^{\prime }\) means that \(q^{\prime }\) is the root node of model \(\mathfrak{M }_k\). We assume that \(k,l,m\in I\) where \(I\) is the index set from Definition 16.

  • Case 1: \(q_1\hat{\sim }_a q_2\). Let \(q_1\in \mathfrak{M }_k\) and \(q_2\in \mathfrak{M }_l\), \(k\ne l\).

    • Case 1.1: \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(q_1)}}=q_1\). That is, \(q_1\) is the root node of \(\mathfrak{M }_k\). We have \(\hat{q}_1=q_1\sim _b^\mathfrak{M }q\). Then, by Definition 16.5 \(|{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}|=|{{\rho _{}}{(q_2)}}|\) which implies \(\hat{q}_2=q_2\). Hence, we have \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}= q_1\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}=q_2\) and are done.

    • Case 1.2 \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(q_2)}}=q_2\). Analogously to Case 1.1.

    • Case 1.3 \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(q_1)}}\hat{\approx }_a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(q_2)}}\) and both \(q_1\) and \(q_2\) are not root nodes.

      • Case 1.3.1 \(\hat{q}_1\hat{\sim }_b^\mathfrak{M }q\). Let \(q\in { St } _m\) with \(m\ne k\).

        • Case 1.3.1.1 \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q_1})}}=\hat{q}_1\). Then, \(\hat{q}_1\hat{\sim }_a^\mathfrak{M }q^{\prime }\) where \(q^{\prime }\in { St } _l\) is the root node of \(\mathfrak{M }_l\). But then, by Definition 16.5 we have \(|{{\rho _{}}{(q^{\prime })}}|=|{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}|\) and thus \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}=\hat{q}_2\). This proves that \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\).

        • Case 1.3.1.2 \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_m}}{({q})}}={q}\). Again, by Definition 16.5 following the same reasoning as in Case 1.3.1.1 we obtain \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}=\hat{q}_2\). Showing that \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\).

        • Case 1.3.1.3 \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1)}}\hat{\approx }^\mathfrak{M }_a{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_m}}{(q)}}\) and neither \(\hat{q}_1\) nor \(q\) are root nodes. Then, we either have that \(l=m\) and \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}{\approx }_a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(q)}}\) which implies that \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\hat{\approx }_a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\). Or, \(l\ne m\) and we have to distinguish again two cases. If \(\hat{q}_2\) is the root node; then, it is connected with the root \(q^{\prime }\in { St } _k\) of \(\mathfrak{M }_k\) by \(\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }\). We have \(q^{\prime }\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }\hat{q}_2\sim _c^\mathfrak{M }q\sim _b^\mathfrak{M }\hat{q}_1\) and by Definition 16.5 it must be the case that \(|{{\rho _{}}{(q^{\prime })}}|=|{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_1)}}|\). Contradiction. Hence, we can safely assume that \(\hat{q}_2\) is not a root. Then, \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}{\approx }_c^\mathfrak{M } {{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_m}}{(q)}}\approx _b^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1)}}\). So, all these states are on the same height level which implies that \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\).

      • Case 1.3.2 \(\hat{q}_2\hat{\sim }_a^\mathfrak{M }q\). Analogously to Case 1.3.1.

      • Case 1.3.3 \(\hat{q}_1\sim _a^{\mathfrak{M }_k} q\) or \(\hat{q}_2\sim _a^{\mathfrak{M }_l} q\). In each of these cases it means that either \(q\not \in { St } _k\) or \(q\not \in { St } _l\) as \(k\ne l\). Case 1.3.1 or Case 1.3.2 applies.

  • Case 2: \(q_1\sim _a^{\mathfrak{M }_k} q_2\). Then, by definition \(k=l\) and \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(q_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(q_2)}}\).

    • Case 2.1: \(q\in { St } _k\). We have \(|{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1)}}|=|{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{({q})}}|=| {{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}|\) which follows from the assumption \(\hat{q}_1\sim _b^{\mathfrak{M }_k} q\sim _c^{\mathfrak{M }_k}\hat{q}_2\); hence also, \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\hat{\approx }_a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\).

    • Case 2.2: \(q\in { St } _m,\ m\ne k\). Then, we have \(\hat{q}_1\hat{\sim }_b^\mathfrak{M }q\hat{\sim }_c^\mathfrak{M }\hat{q}_2\). Again we have to distinguish the different cases how \(q\) is connected to \(\hat{q}_1\) and \(\hat{q}_2\) respectively.

      • Case 2.1.1 \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_m}}{(q)}}=q\). That is, we assume that \(q\) is a root node. By Definition 16.5 we have \(|{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_1)}}|=|{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q_2})}}|\) and \({{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\) follows.

      • Case 2.1.2 \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_m}}{(q)}}\!\ne \! q\). We have \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1)}}\hat{\approx }_b^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{({q})}}\) and \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}\hat{\approx }_c^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_l}}{({q})}}\) which implies \(|{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1)}}|\!=\!|{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_m}}{({q})}}|\!=\!|{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_2)}}|\) and hence \({{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_1,q_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{\mathfrak{M }_k}}{(\hat{q}_2,q_2)}}\).\(\square \)

The next lemma analyses the structure of two indistinguishable nodes from subsequent tree levels.

Lemma 4

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\), \(q\) a state in it, \(h_1\in \Delta ^{i}_\mathfrak{M }(q)\), \(h_2\in \Delta ^{i+1}_\mathfrak{M }(q)\), and \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}h_2\) for some \(i\in \mathbb N _0\). Then, we have that \({ lastr }(h_1)\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\).

Proof

By definition, we have that \( ref (h_2)\sim _a^{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}h_1\) and \({ lastr }( ref (h_2))\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\). Because \( ref (h_2)\in \Delta ^i_\mathfrak{M }(q)\) we also have \({ rel }(h_1)\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }( ref (h_2))\), and hence \({ lastr }(h_1)\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ lastr }( ref (h_2))\). The claim follows because \({ lastr }( ref (h_2))\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\) and by the transitivity of \(\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }\). \(\square \)

The next lemma states that nodes which are indistinguishable for a group of agents must be located on subsequent or the same level of the pando unfolding; moreover, it characterizes the structure of these nodes.

Lemma 5

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\), \(q\) a state in it, and \(A\subseteq {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \) be a group of agents. Then, for all \(h\in { St } _{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}\) there is an \(i\in \mathbb N _0\) such that for all \(h^{\prime }\in { St } _{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}\) with \(h(\sim _A^{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)})^* h^{\prime }\) we have that \(h,h^{\prime }\in \Delta _\mathfrak{M }^i(q)\cup \Delta _\mathfrak{M }^{i+1}(q)\); moreover, if \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^{i+1}_\mathfrak{M }(q)\) \(h(\sim _A^{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)})^* h^{\prime }\) and there is an \(h^{\prime \prime }\in \Delta ^{i}_\mathfrak{M }(q)\) with \(h(\sim _A^{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)})^* h^{\prime \prime }\) then \({ rel }(h^{\prime })\in { St } _\mathfrak{M }\) and \({ jump }(h^{\prime })\in A\).

Proof

We write \(T_s\) for \({T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}\) and \(\Delta ^i\) for \(\Delta ^i_\mathfrak{M }(q)\) and so on. We proceed by induction on the length of the epistemic path \(h^{\prime }=h_1\sim _{a_1}\cdots \sim _{a_{l+1}}h_{{l+1}}\). We show the following: (i) if \(h_j\in \Delta ^i\) for all \(j=1,\ldots , l\) then \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i-1}\cup \Delta ^i\cup \Delta ^{i+1}\); if this is not the case then (ii) if \(h_j\in \Delta ^i\cup \Delta ^{i+1}\) for all \(j=1,\ldots , l\) then \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^i\cup \Delta ^{i+1}\) and for each \(h_j\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) we have that \({ rel }(h_j)\in { St } \), \({ jump }(h_j)\in A\), and \( ref (h_j)\in \Delta ^{i}\).

Base case The case for \(h\sim _a h^{\prime }\) is clear by definition.

Induction step Suppose we have \(h^{\prime }=h_1\sim _{a_1}\cdots \sim _{a_{l}}h_{{l}}\) satisfying the assumption and assume that \(h_l\sim _{a_{l+1}}h_{l+1}\). Firstly, assume that case (i) applies; that is, that all \(h_j\in \Delta ^i\) for \(j=1,\ldots , l\). By definition \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i-1}\cup \Delta ^i\cup \Delta ^{i+1}\). Moreover, if \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) then it must have the required form \(h^{\prime \prime }\hat{a}q^{\prime }\) by Definition 17(c).

We consider case (ii). Firstly, suppose that \(h_l\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) and \(h_l=h^{\prime }\hat{a}_{l}q^{\prime }\). We consider \(h_l\sim _{a_{l+1}}h_{l+1}\). By definition \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i}\cup \Delta ^{i+1}\cup \Delta ^{i+2}\). If \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) it also has the required form. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i+2}\). Then, \(h_{l+1}=h^{\prime \prime }\hat{a}_{l+1}q^{\prime \prime }\) for some \(h^{\prime \prime }\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) with \(h^{\prime \prime }\sim _{a_{l+1}}h_l\). In this case, \(h^{\prime \prime }\) does also have the form \(h^{\prime \prime }=h^{\prime \prime \prime }\hat{a}_{l}q^{\prime \prime \prime }\) and therewith \(h_{l+1}=h^{\prime \prime \prime }\hat{a}_{l}q^{\prime \prime \prime }\hat{a}_{l+1}q^{\prime \prime }\) contradicting \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i+2}\) by definition of the sets \(\Delta ^j \).

Secondly, if \(h_l\in \Delta ^i\) we have that \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i-1}\Delta ^i\cup \Delta ^{i+1}\) and that \(h_{l+1}\) has the required form if \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) following the very same reasoning as in case (i). Moreover, it cannot be the case that \(h_{l+1}\in \Delta ^{i-1}\). To see this, we observe that there is some \(h_u\) with \(1\le u<l+1\), \(h_u\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) and \(h_{l+1}(\sim _A^{T_s})^*h_u\). Now the reasoning of the previous case can be applied to obtain a contradiction. \(\square \)

The next lemma states that the relevant parts (i.e. histories) of two states of the pando unfolding are group indistinguishable in the model if the states are group indistinguishable in the pando unfolding and are located within the same tree (i.e. share the same root node).

Lemma 6

Let \(h_1(\sim _A^{T_s})^* h_2\). If there is an \(i\in \mathbb N _0\) with \(h_1,h_2\in \Delta ^i\) then \({ rel }(h_1){(\approx _A^\mathfrak{M })^*} { rel }(h_2)\).

Proof

The poof is done by induction on the number of epistemic steps between \(h_1\) and \(h_2\). More precisely, we show that for all \(h^{\prime }\) with \(h_1(\sim ^{T_s}_A)^*h^{\prime }\) we have that

  1. (i)

    \({ rel }(h_1)(\approx _A^\mathfrak{M })^* { rel }(h^{\prime })\) if \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^i\);

  2. (ii)

    \( ref (h^{\prime })(\sim ^{T_s}_A)^*h_1\) and \({ lastr }({h_1})(\sim _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ lastr }( ref (h^{\prime }))\) if \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^{i+1}\);

  3. (iii)

    and \({ rel }(h_1)(\sim _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ lastr }(h^{\prime })\) if \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^{i-1}\) (and \(i>0\)).

The base cases are clear by definition. We assume that \(h_1(\sim ^{T_s}_A)^*h^{\prime }\), \(i>0\) and we show that \(h_2\) with \(h_1(\sim _A^{T_s})^*h^{\prime }\sim _a^{T_s}h_2\) for \(a\in A\) satisfies the property of the lemma.

  • Case: \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^i\) and \(h_2\in \Delta ^i\). By definition \({ rel }(h^{\prime })\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\) and by induction \({ rel }(h_1)(\approx _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ rel }(h^{\prime })\); hence, \({ rel }(h_1)(\approx _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ rel }(h_2)\).

  • Case: \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^i\) and \(h_2\in \Delta ^{i+1}\). By induction, \({ rel }(h_1)(\approx ^\mathfrak{M }_A)^*{ rel }(h^{\prime })\) and in particular, \({ lastr }(h_1)\sim _A^*{ lastr }(h^{\prime })\). By Lemma 4 \({ lastr }(h^{\prime })\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\). This shows that, \({ lastr }(h_1)(\sim _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ rel }(h_2)\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ lastr }( ref (h_2))\).

  • Case: \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^i\) and \(h_2\in \Delta ^{i-1}\). By definition \({h_2}\sim _A^{T_s} ref (h^{\prime })\) and \({ rel }(h^{\prime })\sim _A^\mathfrak{M }{ lastr }(h_2)\); hence, \({ rel }(h^{\prime })\in { St } _\mathfrak{M }\). Thus, by induction \({ rel }(h_1)(\sim _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ rel }(h^{\prime })\) and by Lemma 4 \({ rel }(h^{\prime })\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ lastr }(h_2)\). This shows that \({ rel }(h_1)(\sim _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ lastr }(h_2)\).

  • Case: \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^{i-1}\) and \(h_2\in \Delta ^{i-1}\). Follows immediately.

  • Case: \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^{i-1}\) and \(h_2\in \Delta ^{i}\). We have \({ rel }(h_1)(\sim _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ lastr }(h^{\prime })\). By Lemma 4 \({ rel }(h_2)\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ lastr }(h^{\prime })\) and hence \({ rel }(h_1)(\sim _A^\mathfrak{M })^*{ rel }(h_2)\). The claim follows as \({ rel }(h_1),{ rel }(h_2)\in { St } _\mathfrak{M }\).

Cases where \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^j\) and \(h_2\in \Delta ^k\) with \(|j-k|>1\) are not possible due to Lemma 5. \(\square \)

Lemma 7

For all \(q\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\) and all \(i,j\in \mathbb N _0\) with \(i\ne j\) we have that \(\Delta ^i_\mathfrak{M }(q)\cap \Delta ^j_\mathfrak{M }(q)=\emptyset \).

Lemma 8

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\), \(q\) a state in it, and \(a\in {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \). Every relation \(\sim _a^{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}\) is an equivalence relation.

Proof

We write \(T_s\) for \({T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}\). Reflexivity and symmetry of epistemic relations in \(T_s\) are clear from the definition of \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} \)-pando unfoldings, but we need to prove transitivity. Suppose that \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s} h_2\) and \(h_2\sim _a^{T_s} h_3\). We have to show that \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s} h_3\). The proof is done by induction on the level \(\Delta ^i\). The base case for \(\Delta ^0\) is clear from the transitivity of the standard indistinguishability relation \(\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }\). By Lemma 5 (and the symmetry of \(\sim ^{T_s}\)) it is sufficient to consider the following cases (we assume that \(i>0\)):

  • \(h_1,h_2,h_3\in \Delta ^i\): Follows by the transitivity of \(\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }\) (induction hypothesis).

  • \(h_1,h_2\in \Delta ^i, h_3\in \Delta ^{i+1}\): From \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s} h_2\) it follows that \({ rel }(h_1)\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\); and from \(h_2\sim _a^{T_s} h_3\) that \( ref (h_3)\sim _a^{T_s}h_2\) and \({ lastr }( ref (h_3))\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_3)\). Furthermore, because \( ref (h_3)\in \Delta ^i\) we can deduce from the transitivity of \(\sim _a ^{T_s}\) (and by induction) that \( ref (h_3)\sim _a^{T_s}h_1\) and hence \({h_3}\sim _a^{T_s}h_1\) by definition.

  • \(h_1\in \Delta ^i, h_2, h_3\in \Delta ^{i+1}\): We have that \( ref (h_2)\sim _a^{T_s} h_1\) and \({ lastr }( ref (h_2))\sim _a^{T_s}{ rel }(h_2)\) and \({ jump }(h_2)=a\). Then, we also have that \({ rel }(h_2)\approx _a^{T_s}{ rel }(h_3)\) and \({ jump }(h_3)={ jump }(h_2)=a\) and \( ref (h_2)\sim _a^{T_s} ref (h_3)\) proving that also \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s}h_3\) by induction.

  • \(h_1,h_3\in \Delta ^i, h_2\in \Delta ^{i+1}\): We have that \( ref (h_2)\sim _a^{T_s} h_1\) and \({ lastr }( ref (h_2))\sim _a^{T_s}{ rel }(h_2)\) and \({ jump }(h_2)=a\) and \( ref (h_2)\sim _a^{T_s} h_3\) and thus \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s}{h}_3\) (by induction).

  • \(h_1,h_3\in \Delta ^{i+1}, h_2\in \Delta ^{i}\): We have that \( ref (h_1)\sim _a^{T_s} h_2\) and \({ lastr }( ref (h_1))\sim _a^{T_s}{ rel }(h_1)\) and \({ jump }(h_1)=a\) and \( ref (h_3)\sim _a^{T_s} h_2\) \({ lastr }( ref (h_3))\sim _a^{T_s}{ rel }(h_3)\) and \({ jump }(h_3)=a\). But then by induction \( ref (h_1)\sim _a^{T_s} ref (h_3)\) and \({ rel }(h_1)\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_3)\) which shows that \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s}h_3\). \(\square \)

Proposition 8 The \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}}\) -pando unfolding of a pointed i CGS is \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}}\) -pando-like.

Proof

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\) and \(T_s\) its \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} \)-pando unfolding. For each \(h\in { St }^{\prime }\) with \(|{ rel }(h)|=1\) we define \({ St } _h\) as the set of states/histories in \({ St }^{\prime }\) reachable from \(h\), i.e. \({ St } _h=\{h^{\prime }\in { St }^{\prime }\mid {{\rho _{T_s}}{(h,h^{\prime })}}\ne \epsilon \}\). Let \(\mathfrak{M }_h\) denote the submodel of \(T_s\) which does only consist of states \({ St } _h\) and in which the domain of all elements is restricted to \({ St } _h\). Moreover, we take \(I=\{h\in { St } \mid |{ rel }(h)|=1\}\).

Claim: We have that \({ St }^{\prime }=\biguplus _{h\in I}{ St } _h\) and each \(\mathfrak{M }_h\) is \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{o}}{\textit{R}}}} \)-tree-like.

Proof of claim: Clearly, all sets \({ St } _h\) are mutually disjoint and each \(h\in { St } \) has to occur in some \({ St } _h\). It is also obvious that each \(\mathfrak{M }_h\) has tree-structure. Now suppose \(h_1,h_2\in { St } _h\) with \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s} h_2\); then, by definition also \(h_1\approx _a^{\mathfrak{M }} h_2\).

We proceed with the main proof and define \(\hat{\sim }_a\) as the subset of \(\sim _a^{T_s}\) which exists between sets \({ St } _h\) and \({ St } _{h^{\prime }}\) with \(h\ne h^{\prime }\). From Lemma 8 it follows that \(\sim _a^{T_s}\) is transitive and that \(\hat{\sim }_a\) is symmetric. Moreover, by definition \(\hat{\sim }_a\cap ({ St } _h\times { St } _h)=\emptyset \) for all \(h\in { St }^{\prime }\).

The fourth condition of Definition 16 is obvious from the definition of the \({{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} \)-pando unfolding. It remains to show the fifth condition of Definition 16. Suppose \(h_1,h_1^{\prime }\in { St } _{\bar{h}_1}\) and \(h_1(\sim _{\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }})^*h_1^{\prime }\). Then, also \(h_1,h_1^{\prime }\in \Delta _i\) for some \(i\). From Lemma 6 we obtain that \({ rel }(h_1)(\approx _{\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} ^{\mathfrak{M }})^*{ rel }(h_1^{\prime })\), i.e. that both nodes reside on the same level. \(\square \)

The following two lemmata are needed to prove Theorem 3. The first lemma states that the set of epistemic alternatives to any state is the same in the model and in the pando unfolding.

Lemma 9

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an i \(\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}}\) and \(q_0\) a state in it. Then, the following property holds: For all \(A\subseteq {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \) and all nodes \(h\) in \(T_{s}(\mathfrak{M },q_0)\) we have that \(\{q\mid { lastr }(h)\sim _A^\mathfrak{M }q,\ q\in { St } _\mathfrak{M }\}=\{{ lastr }({h^{\prime }}) \mid h^{\prime }\sim _A^{T_{s}(\mathfrak{M },q_0)} h,\ h^{\prime }\in { St } _{T_{s}(\mathfrak{M },q_0)}\}\).

Proof

\(\subseteq \)”: Suppose \(h=h^{\prime }q^{\prime }\in \Delta ^i_\mathfrak{M }(q_0)\) and \(q^{\prime }\sim _A^\mathfrak{M }q\) and \(h^{\prime }\ne \epsilon \) (the case for \(h^{\prime }=\epsilon \) is clear). Then, there is some \(a\in A\) with \(q^{\prime }\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }q\) and thus \(h^{\prime \prime }:=\hat{h}\hat{a}q\in \Delta ^{i+1}_\mathfrak{M }(q_0)\subseteq { St } _{T_{s}(\mathfrak{M },q_0)}\) with \(\hat{h}\sim ^{T_s}_a h\) by definition of the \(\Delta ^j_\mathfrak{M }\)’s. By Definition 17 also \(h^{\prime \prime }\sim _A^{T_{s}(\mathfrak{M },q_0)} h\). The claim follows as \({ lastr }(h^{\prime \prime })=q\).

\(\supseteq \)”: Suppose \(h^{\prime }\sim _A^{T_{s}(\mathfrak{M },q_0)} h\) and \(h^{\prime }\in { St } _{T_{s}(\mathfrak{M },q_0)}\). The claim is clear if \(h,h^{\prime }\in \Delta ^i_\mathfrak{M }(q_0)\). According to Definition 17 the remaining case is when \(h\in \Delta ^i_\mathfrak{M }(q)\) and \(h^{\prime }\in \Delta _\mathfrak{M }^{i+1}(q)\), or the roles of \(h\) and \(h^{\prime }\) switched. Then, \(h^{\prime }=\hat{h}\hat{a}q\), \(\hat{h}\sim ^{T_s}_ah\) for some \(a\in {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \) and \({ lastr }(\hat{h})\sim _a^\mathfrak{M }q\). The claim follows as \({ lastr }(h^{\prime })=q\) and \({ lastr }(h)\sim _A^\mathfrak{M }q\). \(\square \)

The next lemma is needed to show that the witnessing strategy which we shall construct in the invariance Theorem 3 is uniform.

Lemma 10

Let \(\mathfrak{M }\) be an \(\mathbf{i }\mathbf{CGS _{\mathbf{}}} \), \(q\) a state in it, \(T_s=T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)\), \(h,\hat{h}_1, \hat{h}_2\in { St } _{T_s}\), \(A\subseteq {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \), and \(a\in {\mathbb{A }\mathrm{gt }} \). If \(\hat{h}_1\sim _A^{T_s} h\sim _A^{T_s}\hat{h}_2\) and \(h_1=\hat{h}_1h_1^F\sim _a\hat{h}_2h_2^F=h_2\) with \(h_1^F,h_2^F\in \varLambda _{}^{fin}\); then, (\({ rel }(h_1)\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\), \({{\rho _{}}{(\hat{h}_1,h_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{h}_2,h_2)}}\) and \(|h_1^F|=|h_2^F|\)), or \(h_1^F=h_2^F=\epsilon \).

Proof

Suppose \(\hat{h}_1\sim _b^{T_s} h\sim _c^{T_s}\hat{h}_2\) with \(b,c\in A\). From Lemma 3 we obtain \({{\rho _{}}{(\hat{h}_1,h_1)}}\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{h}_2,h_2)}}\) by taking \(\hat{q}_i=\hat{h}_i\) and \(q_i=h_i\) and \(q=h\) for \(i=1,2\).

To prove the lemma, we firstly assume that \(h_1,h_2\in \Delta ^i\) for some \(i\in \mathbb N _0\). Then, by definition \({ rel }(h_1)\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{ rel }(h_2)\) and the claim follows.

Secondly, suppose w.l.o.g. \(h_1\in \Delta ^i\) and \(h_2\in \Delta ^{i+1}\) for some \(i\in \mathbb N _0\). In this case \({ rel }(h_2)\in { St } \) and thus \(h_2^F=\epsilon \) and \({{\rho _{}}{(\hat{h}_2,h_2)}}={ rel }(h_2)\approx _a^\mathfrak{M }{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{h}_1,h_1)}}\). The latter implies that \(|{{\rho _{}}{(\hat{h}_1,h_1)}}|=1\) and hence \(h_1^F=\epsilon \). \(\square \)

Theorem 3 For every i CGS \(\mathfrak{M }\), state \(q\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\), and \({{\varvec{ATL}}}^{*}\) -formula \(\varphi \), it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{M },q\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\varphi \text { iff }T_s (\mathfrak{M },q),q\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\varphi \text { iff }T_s (\mathfrak{M },q),q\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{r}}}} }}}}\varphi . \end{aligned}$$

Proof

We show that for every node \(h\) in \(T_s:=T_s (\mathfrak{M },q)\) it holds that \(\mathfrak{M },{ lastr }(h)\models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} \varphi \) iff \(T_s (\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{r}}}}}\varphi \). Then, the claim follows from Propositions 7 and 8 for \(h=q\). The proof is done by induction on the structure of \(\varphi \) and is similar to the proof given for Theorem 2.

Base cases:

  • Propositional case: Straightforward.

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \) where \(\gamma \) contains no nested strategic modalities. “\(\Rightarrow \)”: Suppose we have \(\mathfrak{M },{ lastr }(h)\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \) and let \(s_A\) be an \(iR\)-strategy with

    $$\begin{aligned} (\star )\ \forall \lambda \in out^{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}}}_\mathfrak{M }({ lastr }(h),s_A): \mathfrak{M },\lambda \models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\gamma . \end{aligned}$$

    We construct the \({\textit{ir}} \)-strategy \(s_A^{\prime }\) in \(T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)\) as follows: for all \(\hat{h}\in { St } _{T_s}\) with \(h\sim _A^{T_s}\hat{h}\) and all \(h^F\in \varLambda _{\mathfrak{M }}^{fin}({ lastr }(\hat{h}))\) we set

    $$\begin{aligned} s^{\prime }_a(\hat{h}(h^F[1,\infty ])):=s_a(h^F). \end{aligned}$$

    We note that we have to exclude the first state in \(h^F\) because it is already contained in \(\hat{h}\). For all other histories \(h^{\prime \prime }\) (which do not have the prescribed form) we define \(s^{\prime }_a(h^{\prime \prime })\) arbitrarily but in a uniform way. The setting is illustrated in Fig. 16. Clearly, we have that each \(\hat{h}(h^F[1,\infty ])\) is a valid state in \(T_s\) and by Lemma 10, \(s^{\prime }_a\) is well-defined: Suppose, there are \(h_1=\hat{h}_1h_1^F\) and \(h_2=\hat{h}_2h_2^F\) with \(h_1=h_2\). Then, also \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s}h_2\) and by Lemma 10 \(h_1^F=h_2^F\) which shows that \(s_a^{\prime }(h_1)=s_a^{\prime }(h_2)\). In the following we show that \(s_a^{\prime }\) is uniform. Let \(h_1\) and \(h_2\) be two histories with \(h_1\sim _a^{T_s}h_2\).

    1. 1.

      Assume that both nodes have the form from above, i.e. \(h_1=\hat{h}_1h_1^F\), \(h_1=\hat{h}_1h_1^F\) and \(h_1\sim _A^{T_s} h\sim _A^{T_s} h_2\). Then, uniformity follows from Lemma 10.

    2. 2.

      Choices for two histories \(h_1\) and \(h_2\) where at least one does not have the required form can be defined in a uniform way by definition because \(\sim _a^{T_s}\) is an equivalence relation.

    Finally, we show that the sets of outcome paths are isomorphic wrt. both strategies. By Lemma 9 we have that for all states \(q_0\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\) the following holds \(q_0\sim _A^{\mathfrak{M }} { lastr }(h)\) iff there is a history \(h^{\prime }\) with \(h^{\prime }\sim ^{T_s}_A h\) and \({ lastr }(h^{\prime })=q_0\). We denote one of these histories \(h^{\prime }\) by \(h(q_0)\). Then, by construction of \(s_A^{\prime }\) we have that

    $$\begin{aligned}&q_0q_1q_2\cdots \in out^{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}}}_\mathfrak{M }(last(h),s_A)\\&\quad \text {iff}\quad (h^{\prime })(h^{\prime }q_1)(h^{\prime }q_1q_2)\cdots \in out^{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}}}_{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}(h,s_A^{\prime })\\&\quad \text { for some }h^{\prime }=h(q_0). \end{aligned}$$

    Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and by \((\star )\) we have \(T_s (\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{r}}}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \). \(\Leftarrow \): For the other direction, suppose we have \(T_s(\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{r}}}} }}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \). So, there is an ir-strategy \(s_A\) such that

    $$\begin{aligned} (\star )\ \forall \lambda \in out^{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}}}_{T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)}(h,s_A): T_s(\mathfrak{M },q),\lambda \models _{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{r}}}}}\gamma . \end{aligned}$$

    We construct a witnessing \({\textit{iR}} \)-strategy \(s_A^{\prime }\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\) as follows: \(s_a^{\prime }(h^F)=s_a(\hat{h}\hat{a}h^F)\) for every \(a\in A\), \(\hat{h}\sim ^{T_s}_A h\) for \(h^F\in \Lambda ^{fin}(q^{\prime })\) with \(q^{\prime }\sim _A^\mathfrak{M }{ lastr }(h)\) and arbitrary but in a uniform way for all other histories. It is easy to verify that each strategy \(s_a^{\prime }\) is uniform and well-defined. Moreover, \(s_A^{\prime }\) yields an equivalent (apart from the notational differences) set of outcome paths as above. We have \(\mathfrak{M },{ lastr }(h)\models _{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}}}\langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \).

Fig. 16
figure 16

Setting of the proof of Theorem 3

Induction step:

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \psi _1\wedge \psi _2\). Straightforward.

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \lnot \psi \). \(\mathfrak{M },{ lastr }(h)\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\lnot \psi \) iff not \(\mathfrak{M },{ lastr }(h)\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\psi \) iff (by induction hypothesis) not \(T_s(\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\psi \) iff \(T_s(\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{_{{{ {{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} }}}}\lnot \psi \).

  • Case: \(\varphi \equiv \langle \!\langle {A}\rangle \!\rangle _{_{\!{ }}}\gamma \). By induction hypothesis we have for each history \(h\) in \(T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)\) and each strict state-subformula \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) of \(\gamma \) that \(\mathfrak{M },{ lastr }(h)\models _{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{R}}}} \varphi ^{\prime }\) iff \(T_s (\mathfrak{M },q),h\models _{{{{\textit{i}}_{\textit{s}}}{{\textit{r}}}}}\varphi ^{\prime }\). For any maximal strict state-subformula \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) we label all states \(h\) in \(T_s(\mathfrak{M },q)\) and states \({ lastr }(h)\) in \(\mathfrak{M }\) with a new proposition \(\mathsf{{p} }_{\varphi ^{\prime }}\) iff \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) holds in this very state. Then, we replace each \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) in \(\varphi \) with proposition \(\mathsf{{p} }_{\varphi ^{\prime }}\) and the claim follows by induction. \(\square \)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bulling, N., Jamroga, W. Comparing variants of strategic ability: how uncertainty and memory influence general properties of games. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst 28, 474–518 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-013-9231-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-013-9231-3

Keywords

Navigation