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Effects of a navigation spoofing signal on a receiver loop and a UAV spoofing approach

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A Correction to this article was published on 14 August 2020

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Abstract

A civil navigation signal is vulnerable to interference and tampering owing to its open interface and low signal power. We focus on navigation spoofing. First, using a piecewise function, we quantitatively analyze the effects of the navigation spoofing signal on the receiver tracking loop. For a phase-locked loop, the spoofing signal extends the pull-in range of the discriminator. The autocorrelation gain of the spoofing signal has a different effect on the slope of the discriminator, depending on whether the discriminator is related to the signal amplitude. For the delay-locked loop, taking the non-coherent early minus late power method as an example, the unlocking condition and interval are analyzed quantitatively using the spoofing amplitude gain and the initial phase cosine of the spoofing and authentic carriers. A carrier frequency difference between the spoofing signal and authentic signal causes a phase jump and attenuation of the amplitude gain. Second, in luring an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to a designated location, we assume a UAV model and provide a spoofing strategy. Experimental results show that it is feasible to lure a civilian quadrotor UAV to a designated location about 50 m from where the UAV believes it is located.

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Change history

  • 14 August 2020

    In the original article, some typos regarding Eq. (1) and respective sentence are corrected, and corrections are made to a sentence in section ���Effect of the frequency difference on the PLL and DLL���.

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Acknowledgements

We thank Glenn Pennycook, MSc, from Liwen Bianji, Edanz Group China (www.liwenbianji.cn/ac), for editing the English text of a draft of this manuscript.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Intelligence Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, No. 109, Deya Road, Changsha, 410073, China

    Chao Ma, Jun Yang, Jianyun Chen, Zhi Qu & Chao Zhou

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  1. Chao Ma
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  2. Jun Yang
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  3. Jianyun Chen
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Correspondence to Jun Yang.

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Ma, C., Yang, J., Chen, J. et al. Effects of a navigation spoofing signal on a receiver loop and a UAV spoofing approach. GPS Solut 24, 76 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10291-020-00986-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10291-020-00986-z

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