Abstract
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we consider a class of games with a permission structure describing situations in which players in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. The corresponding restricted game takes account of the limited cooperation possibilities by assigning to every coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset. In this paper we provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with a permission structure which economic applications include auction games, dual airport games, dual polluted river games and information market games.
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Acknowledgements
This research has been done while the second author was visiting the Tinbergen Institute, VU Amsterdam, on NWO-grant 047.017.017 within the framework of Dutch-Russian cooperation. This authorwas also financially supported by RFBR-grant 09-06-00155. We thank two referees for their useful comments.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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van den Brink, R., Katsev, I. & van der Laan, G. A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure. Int J Game Theory 40, 591–616 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0257-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0257-3
Keywords
- TU-game
- Nucleolus
- Game with permission structure
- Peer group game
- Information market game
- Algorithm
- Complexity