Abstract
We consider repeated games where the number of repetitions θ is unknown. The information about the uncertain duration can change during the play of the game. This is described by an uncertain duration process Θ that defines the probability law of the signals that players receive at each stage about the duration. To each repeated game Γ and uncertain duration process Θ is associated the Θ-repeated game ΓΘ. A public uncertain duration process is one where the uncertainty about the duration is the same for all players. We establish a recursive formula for the value V Θ of a repeated two-person zero-sum game ΓΘ with a public uncertain duration process Θ. We study asymptotic properties of the normalized value v Θ = V Θ/E(θ) as the expected duration E (θ) goes to infinity. We extend and unify several asymptotic results on the existence of lim v n and lim v λ and their equality to lim v Θ. This analysis applies in particular to stochastic games and repeated games of incomplete information.
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Neyman, A., Sorin, S. Repeated games with public uncertain duration process. Int J Game Theory 39, 29–52 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0197-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0197-y