Abstract
We study the set of envy-free allocations for economies with indivisible objects and quasi-linear utility functions. We characterize the minimal amount of money necessary for its nonemptiness when negative distributions of money are not allowed. We also find that, when this is precisely the available amount of money, there is a unique way to combine objects and money such that these bundles may form an envy-free allocation. Based on this property, we describe a solution to the envy-free selection problem following a pseudo-egalitarian criterion. This solution coincides with the “Money Rawlsian Solution” proposed by Alkan et al. (1991).
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I am indebted to I. Gilboa for his valuable suggestions and his patience during the elaboration of the final version. I also wish to thank S. Barbera for his guidance in an earlier version and M. Boldrin, H. Moulin, Z. Neeman, W. Thomson and the referees for their comments. Financial support from FPU-MEC (Spain) is gratefully acknowledged.
Northwestern University.
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Aragones, E. A derivation of the money Rawlsian solution. Soc Choice Welfare 12, 267–276 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179981
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179981